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PROCEDURAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Jonathan Skinner-Thompson*
Abstract: Achieving environmental justice—that is, the fair treatment and meaningful
involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income, with respect to
the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and
policies—requires providing impacted communities not just the formal right, but the
substantive ability, to participate as equal partners at every level of environmental decisionmaking. While established administrative policy purports to provide all people with so-called
meaningful involvement in the regulatory process, the public participation process often
excludes marginalized community members from exerting meaningful influence on decisionmaking. Especially in the environmental arena, regulatory decisions are often buried among
engineering analyses or modeling assumptions.
This Article theorizes and calls for an empowered participatory process—one that provides
environmental justice communities (those that are disproportionately exposed to pollution)
with the consultation and technical expertise needed to bolster the authority of their lived
experiences in order to substantively influence regulatory outcomes. While scholars and
advocates have rightly foregrounded certain disparities in regulatory outcomes (for example,
decisions about where facilities should be located and where enforcement resources are
invested), far less attention is paid to the decision-making process that governs what pollution
controls can, should, or must be installed. Yet these decisions legalize acceptable levels of
pollution that a community must bear and sanction those levels for a generation to come.
Environmental justice communities can—if properly supported—push back against inadequate
or cursory approvals of what controls are implemented to reduce or avoid pollution. They can
even press for better or alternative controls, buttressing recommendations with technical
advocacy. Ultimately, this support can help improve administrative decision-making and
reinforces a central tenet of the environmental justice movement—that communities be
empowered to speak for themselves.
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INTRODUCTION
The Commerce City-North Denver metropolitan area is home to a
diverse community, including many people of color, predominantly
Spanish-speaking households, and low-income individuals.1 The area
includes not only houses and parks, but also a network of highways and
industrial facilities.2 One such facility is the Suncor Refinery—really,
three plants from two refineries split by a boulevard.3 Plants 1 and 2 are
1. See Community Health & the Environment in Commerce City-North Denver, COLO. ENV’T PUB.
HEALTH TRACKING, https://coepht.colorado.gov/ccnd [https://perma.cc/2SE5-YP3E].
2. See Kevin Beaty, Brighton Boulevard Is Home to One of the Largest Polluters in the State. As
the Newcomers Move In, Suncor May See More Pressure to Clean Up Its Act., DENVERITE (Oct. 4,
2019, 6:11 PM), https://denverite.com/2019/10/04/brighton-boulevard-is-home-to-one-of-thelargest-polluters-in-the-state-as-the-hipsters-move-in-suncor-may-see-more-pressure-to-clean-upits-act/ [https://perma.cc/SWJ3-MDCW] (“Past the old homes in Elyria Swansea, just beyond the
city’s first cemetery, is the site of massive oil refining operations that date back to the 1940s.”).
3. COLO. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, OPERATING PERMIT FOR SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC.
– COMMERCE CITY REFINERY, PLANT 1 (WEST PLANT) & PLANT 3 (ASPHALT UNIT) (2018),
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0B0tmPQ67k3NVNi1ueTlmYzRULWc
[https://perma.cc/CP4G-ZF5A] [hereinafter SUNCOR TITLE V OPERATING PERMIT (PLANTS 1 AND
3)]; COLO. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, OPERATING PERMIT FOR SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) –
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major suppliers of gasoline and diesel fuel for Colorado; Plant 3 is the
state’s main producer of asphalt.4 Suncor currently has two separate air
operating permits issued by the Colorado Department of Public Health
and Environment (CDPHE), which cover processes such as atmospheric
and vacuum distillation, desalting, reforming, catalytic cracking, catalytic
polymerization, and hydrotreating.5
The Suncor Refinery is a recurring source of “operational upsets”6 and
bursts of “clay-like” smoke7 (and that’s just the air pollution).8 In fact, a
2017 study found that the neighborhood surrounding the Refinery was the
most polluted area in the United States.9 According to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), more than 55% of the
population within three miles of the Refinery live below the poverty line,
and more than 75% of residents identify as a racial minority.10 “If this isn’t
environmental injustice, I don’t know what is,” reported one community
organizer; “[e]very time we smell that pollution, I think: We just died a

COMMERCE CITY REFINERY, PLANT 2 (EAST) (2009), https://drive.google.com/drive/
folders/0B0tmPQ67k3NVb3kyU3Byb0cybVU [https://perma.cc/5LYD-AY53].
4. COLO. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, SUNCOR PERMIT RENEWAL: PUBLIC INPUT
OPPORTUNITIES, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mnlo4ZzTkZGyLJ6_9EGNtNRF8dCQNx_s/view
[https://perma.cc/M7WK-NE5R].
5. SUNCOR TITLE V OPERATING PERMIT (PLANTS 1 AND 3), supra note 3, at 1.
6. Bruce Finley, Suncor Oil Refinery’s “Operational Upset” Spurs Call for Increased State
Protection,
DENVER
POST
(Dec.
13,
2019,
6:31
AM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/12/13/suncor-refinery-emissions-pollution/ (last visited Apr. 7,
2022); see also Bruce Finley, Suncor Oil Refinery Spewed Hundreds of Pounds of Toxic Gases over
Denver—Again—After Xcel Power Outage, DENVER POST (Mar. 17, 2017, 9:14 AM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2017/03/16/suncor-oil-refinery-toxic-gas-denver-xcel/ (last visited
Apr. 7, 2022); Bruce Finley, Suncor Oil Refinery Emitted Elevated Hydrogen Sulfide and Other Gas,
at Levels Beyond the Plant that Company Officials Called ‘Acceptable’, DENVER POST (Aug. 15,
2020, 11:30 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2020/08/14/suncor-energy-refinery-pollutionhydrogen-sulfide/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2022).
7. Bruce Finley, Suncor Energy Oil Refinery North of Denver Emits Burst of “Clay-Like” and
Hydrogen Sulfide Air Pollution, DENVER POST (Mar. 18, 2020, 10:48 PM), https://www.denverpost.
com/2020/03/17/suncor-energy-oil-refinery-denver-air-pollution/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2022).
8. Bruce Finley, Suncor Reports Chemical Sheen on Sand Creek, Breach of Containment Area at
Refinery North of Denver, DENVER POST (May 28, 2020, 3:25 PM), https://www.denverpost.
com/2020/05/27/suncor-refinery-chemical-sheen-sand-creek/
[https://perma.cc/AT24-EFMW]
(describing a “sheen of benzene and other chemicals” detected on the surface of Sand Creek); see
also Bruce Finley, Colorado Ramps Up Response to Toxic “Forever Chemicals” After Discovery of
Hot Spots Across Metro Denver, DENVER POST (July 14, 2021, 2:33 PM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/09/10/pfas-chemical-contamination-denver-colorado/
(last
visited Apr. 7, 2022) (reporting elevated levels of PFAS (toxic “forever chemicals”) contaminating
Suncor’s property that may be spreading into Sand Creek, the South Platte River, and groundwater).
9. Complaint at 6, WildEarth Guardians v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, No. 2021-CV30213 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 16, 2021).
10. Id. at 7.
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little. It’s like we are closer to death.”11
To achieve environmental justice—that is, the fair treatment and
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national
origin, or income, with respect to the development, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies12—for
marginalized communities, however, requires more than just extra process
and more outreach. Indeed, those efforts could be counterproductive—to
the extent they create a patina of participation and false legitimacy without
empowered participation.13 In order to make meaningful change, an
environmental justice agenda must provide impacted communities not just
the formal right, but the substantive ability to participate as partners at
every level of environmental decision-making. While established
administrative policy purports to provide all people with so-called
meaningful involvement in the regulatory process,14 the public
participation process nevertheless often excludes marginalized
community members from exerting meaningful influence on the decisionmaking process. Especially in the environmental arena, regulatory
decisions are often buried among engineering analyses or modeling
assumptions.15 Environmental regulation is difficult, dense, and often
inaccessible to people without extremely specific training.16 Even courts
are reluctant to second-guess the scientific and technical judgments of
expert agencies.17 How then can impacted communities’ perspectives be
given real weight, shaping important decisions that affect their daily lives?
This Article calls for an empowered participatory process—one that
provides environmental justice communities with the consultation and
technical expertise needed to bolster the authority of their lived
experiences in order to substantively influence regulatory outcomes.
While scholars and advocates have rightly foregrounded certain
disparities in regulatory outcomes (for example, decisions about where
facilities should be located and where enforcement resources are
invested), far less attention is paid to the decision-making process that
governs what pollution controls can, should, or must be installed once

11. Bruce Finley, Suncor Refinery Faces Colorado Review of Outdated Permits, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Dec. 5, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/denver-colorado-air-pollution-pollution-3741aede1
fb41dee483b1d34e241d702 (last visited Apr. 7, 2022).
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra section I.A.
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra section II.C.
16. Id.
17. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
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facilities exist.18 Yet these decisions legalize acceptable levels of
pollution that a community must bear and sanction those levels for
generations to come.19 Environmental justice communities can—if
properly supported—push back against inadequate or cursory approvals
of lenient controls. They can even press for better or alternative controls,
grounding their recommendations in technical advocacy. This is not to
suggest that technical judgments are divorced from normative choices, but
it recognizes that successful advocacy will require a degree of scientific
fluency.
Some environmental statutes include models for how to provide this
very support. The federal Superfund law20—regulating the cleanup of
contaminated soils, sediments, and groundwater—offers grant funds “to
community groups to contract their own technical advisor to interpret and
explain technical reports, site conditions, and EPA’s proposed cleanup
proposals and decisions.”21 This Article uses the Superfund experience as
a case study and recommends establishing a technical advisory program
to help communities engage meaningfully with environmental decisionmakers on pollution control as well. In doing so, environmental justice
communities will gain the tools and capabilities to weigh in on technical
judgments that have real and long-term impacts to their health and
environment and attach substance to their right of participation.22
Public participation is a fundamental principle of democratic
governance.23 But to ensure meaningful engagement in regulatory
decision-making, governance reformists must be mindful of three
principles of administrative law. The first is that agencies must consider
all significant comments received during notice-and-comment decisionmaking.24 The second is that significant comments are those that may
18. See infra section I.B.
19. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“The court may adopt
as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an
administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of
persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to protect the particular interest
which is invaded, and (c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.”).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675.
21. Superfund: Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) Program, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/technical-assistance-grant-tag-program
[https://perma.cc/2XEGXSKQ].
22. Adding substance to procedure is not unique to environmental advocacy. See generally, e.g.,
Robert J. Miller, Consultation or Consent: The United States’ Duty to Confer with American Indian
Governments, 91 N.D. L. REV. 37 (2015) (critiquing “tribal consultation” practices as purely
procedural in nature without any substantive right or effect).
23. See infra section I.B.
24. Home Box Off., Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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cause an agency to change course or alter a rule.25 The third is that legal
challenges to an agency decision must be based on issues that were raised
with reasonable specificity during the comment period.26 These three
principles highlight not only the importance of public participation in
administrative governance, but the necessity of effective participation.
With these principles in mind, this Article proposes a capacity-based
approach27 to assessing procedural justice (or at least in defining
meaningful involvement).28 In doing so, the Article builds on democratic
governance and environmental justice scholarship by focusing on the
administrative state29 and draws from my experience at the EPA and my
work with small, under-resourced community and environmental groups.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces and analyzes the
theoretical foundations of environmental and procedural justice,
underscoring the need for meaningful participation as a part of any
environmental justice agenda. Part II analyzes the complex regulatory
framework for addressing air quality, explaining how it fails to promote
the theories of environmental justice and public participation outlined in
Part I. Part III describes the enhanced public participation opportunities
available under the federal Superfund program while foregrounding its
strengths and limitations. Part III also provides a case study of the Lower
Duwamish Waterway Superfund site, which is the first and only
Superfund site to include a stand-alone environmental justice analysis.
Finally, Part IV draws from the Superfund analysis and case study to
propose and outline the establishment of technical advisory groups to
support environmental justice communities in other important regulatory
contexts, helping fulfill some of the core environmental justice principles
outlined in Part I. While its focus on empowered participation is situated
in the environmental justice context, the Article also holds lessons for
participatory procedure more broadly in other administrative governance
25. Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Home Box Off., 567
F.2d at 35 & n.58).
26. See infra note 86.
27. This approach dovetails from the capability approach to justice pioneered by Amartya Sen and
further developed by Martha Nussbaum. Ingrid Robeyns & Morton Fibieger Byskov, The Capability
Approach, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/capabilityapproach/ [https://perma.cc/8KHP-ESTM]. In particular, Nussbaum’s list of capabilities includes the
ability to participate effectively in political choices. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING
CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 33–34 (2011).
28. Providing funds for technical support in rulemakings and permitting decisions will not solve all
of the systemic injustices faced by environmental justice communities, but it can help those
communities meaningfully engage in highly technical decisions. And though their participation may
slow regulatory decisions, effective participation by affected communities can bring legitimacy to
agency decision-making and build trust in a process that might otherwise be opaque or exclusionary.
29. See infra sections I.A–.B.
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contexts by offering a substantive lens through which to examine
procedural rights like public participation.30
I.

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING

Environmental justice—as widely defined31—is the (1) fair treatment
and (2) meaningful involvement of all people32 regardless of race, color,
national origin, or income with respect to the development, and
implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and
policies.33 More broadly, environmental justice refers to those cultural
30. For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is currently taking steps to establish
an Office of Public Participation and has solicited input on forming such an office. See FED. ENERGY
REGUL. COMM’N, THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (2021), https://www.ferc.gov/media/fercreport-office-public-participation [https://perma.cc/Q9GH-3S6Z].
31. This “standard definition” of environmental justice was introduced by the EPA’s Office of
Environmental Justice in 1998. Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENV’T
L. REP. 10681, 10682–83 (2000). Notably, the 1998 definition was limited to “fair treatment” and
only included “development and enforcement” of environmental laws, but not “implementation.” Id.
The definition evolved from earlier uses of the term environmental equity, which meant the “equitable
distribution of environmental risks across population groups.” Id. at 10682. Because “equity” failed
to promote risk reduction and avoidance, the EPA shifted to a “justice” lens in 1994 (renaming its
Office of Environmental Equity, for example, to the Office of Environmental Justice). Other terms,
including environmental racism, environmental discrimination, and environmental injustice, are
sometimes used (particularly when identifying institutional causes and problems). Id. (defining
“environmental racism” as “any policy, practice or directive that differentially affects or
disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or communities based on race
or color” and “environmental discrimination” as the “disparate treatment of a group or community
based on race, class, or some other distinguishing characteristic”). Today most advocates and scholars
employ environmental justice to focus on solutions and to include issues like class and tribal
sovereignty. See id. at 10682; INDIGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (Karen Jarratt-Snider &
Marianne O. Nielsen eds., 2020); DINA GILIO-WHITAKER, AS LONG AS GRASS GROWS: THE
INDIGENOUS FIGHT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, FROM COLONIZATION TO STANDING ROCK
(2019).
32. Some definitions limited attention to “citizens.” Compare MELINDA DOWNING, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION THROUGH TECHNOLOGY—
BUILDING
COMMUNITY
CAPACITY
(1999),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/EJ_
buildingcommunitycapacity_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XQF-2JYD] (defining environmental justice as
“the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all citizens in environmental decision-making”),
with Clifford J. Villa, Remaking Environmental Justice, 66 LOY. L. REV. 469, 478–80 (2020)
(discussing concerns with “all people” in light of the Black Lives Matter movement and the
countertextual “All Lives Matter”).
33. See Aelita Neimanis, Heather Castleden & Daniel Rainham, Examining the Place of Ecological
Integrity in Environmental Justice: A Systematic Review, 17 INT’L J. JUST. & SUSTAINABILITY 349,
358 (2012) (finding after a systematic review of relevant literature that “the EPA main
definition . . . of environmental justice was cited most frequently”). This definition is not without its
detractors. See, e.g., Environmental Justice & Environmental Racism, GREENACTION,
http://greenaction.org/what-is-environmental-justice/ [https://perma.cc/6DTH-QN7R] (“Government
agencies, like the EPA, have been trying to coopt the movement by redefining environmental justice
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norms, values, rules, regulations, behaviors, policies, and decisions to
support sustainable communities where people can interact with
confidence that the environment is safe, nurturing, and productive.34
As defined above, there are two pillars of environmental justice: fair
treatment and meaningful involvement. Fair treatment means that no
group of people should bear a disproportionate share of any negative
environmental consequences.35 Meaningful involvement means that
people have an opportunity to participate in decisions that may affect their
environment or health; that their contributions can influence regulatory
decisions; that their concerns will be considered in the decision-making
process; and that decision makers will seek out and facilitate the
involvement of those potentially affected.36 While both are critical
dimensions of environmental justice, this Article is focused on the second
pillar—meaningful involvement.
Several legal scholars have offered alternative models to improve
public input in administrative governance, but those models fall short for
historically marginalized communities.37 Environmental justice scholars,
meanwhile, have tried to more squarely target the structural barriers to full
and meaningful participation of those same communities.38 Nevertheless,
I contend that because these efforts fail to displace traditional notice-andcomment decision-making, they too fail to fully empower environmental
justice communities.
A.

A History of Public Participation Models in Administrative
Governance
Public participation is a central feature of democratic governance.39

as ‘fair treatment and meaningful involvement,’ something they consistently fail to accomplish, but
which also falls far short of the environmental justice vision.”).
34. Bunyan Bryant, Pollution Prevention and Participatory Research as a Methodology for
Environmental Justice, 14 VA. ENV’T L.J. 589, 589 n.1 (1995).
35. Learn
About
Environmental
Justice,
U.S.
ENV’T
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/learn-about-environmental-justice
[https://perma.cc/
Q5AE-QX7U]. Fair treatment is a form of “distributive justice,” which (as a concept) goes back as
far as Aristotle. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 3 (1975).
36. Learn About Environmental Justice, supra note 35. Meaningful involvement, as a form of
“procedural justice,” is a much newer concept than distributive justice. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra
note 35, at 2. And to some (such as legal practitioners and scholars), procedural justice has attained
“supreme importance.” Id.
37. See infra section I.B.
38. See id.
39. While this Article is focused on democratic governance, public participation may also be a
fundamental or human right—a subject for further research.
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The belief that every person has a voice is a cornerstone of deliberative
democracy.40 Participatory theorists have long argued that meaningful
participation not only leads to better decisions, “but also facilitates social
stability by developing a sense of community, increasing collective
decision making, and promoting acceptance and respect of the governance
process.”41 This notion is an equally “enduring tradition in administrative
law.”42
40. Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 216, 216
(1969). And it is no longer unique to the United States. See, e.g., Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters, art. 6–8, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (calling for party States to ensure public
participation in certain environmental decision-making activities); Milan Declaration of the Sixth
International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change, Nov. 30, 2003,
http://www.ilc.unsw.edu.au/sites/ilc.unsw.edu.au/files/mdocs/milan%20declaration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/429P-GQL7] (calling for “necessary support to indigenous peoples for their full and
effective participation in all levels of discussion, decision making and implementation as well as
ensuring that the necessary funding be provided to guarantee such participation and to strengthen their
capacities”); see also Jeroen van Bekhoven, Public Participation as a General Principle in
International Environmental Law: Its Current Status and Real Impact, 11 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV.
219, 248–58 (2016) (finding that public participation is widely accepted and firmly embedded in the
international environmental legal framework).
41. Kathe Callahan, Citizen Participation: Models and Methods, 30 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 1179,
1180 (2007) (citing CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970)); see also
Mark Squillace, Meaningful Engagement in Public Lands Decision Making, 59 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 21-1, 21-7 to 21-10 (2013) (discussing five social goals for promoting public participation:
(1) incorporating public values into decisions; (2) improving substantive quality of the decision;
(3) resolving conflict among competing interests; (4) building trust in institutions; and (5) educating
and informing the public). But see id. at 21-10 to 21-13 (discussing arguments against public
engagement, including cost considerations and context); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The
Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 247–
49 (1997) (concluding that mass participation must be balanced with deliberative values).
42. Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm
Paradox, 17 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 3, 17 (1998); see also Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in
Administrative Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1300, 1302 n.1 (2016) (“See, e.g., COMM. ON ADMIN.
PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. REP. NO. 77-8, at 103
(1941) (advocating the APA’s passage, stating that participation would be ‘essential . . . to
permit . . . agencies to inform themselves and to afford adequate safeguards to private interests’);
Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 95, 101 (2003) (describing the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as ‘a one-trick pony,’
because ‘[a]ll of its basic provisions rely on a single method for controlling the actions of
administrative agencies, namely, participation by private parties’); Wendy Wagner, The
Participation-Centered Model Meets Administrative Process, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 671, 677–78 (2013)
(describing the goal of ‘[m]aximizing the participation of affected parties, without bias or capture,’
as ‘central to the design of administrative process’); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas,
Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2012) (noting that ‘virtually all of the
major theories that seek to legitimate administrative decision-making see participation as important’);
William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law—Three Examples as
an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 171 (2009) (‘“Public participation” and “transparency”
are hallmarks of American administrative law . . . .’); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A
Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (1982) (‘To the extent that rulemaking has political legitimacy,
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Legal scholars have identified three models of decision-making in our
regulatory agencies: expertise (sometimes called technocratic or
managerial); pluralistic; and civic republicanism.43 The expertise model
relies heavily on formal expertise and “ultimately rests upon empiricism
and faith in the ability of science and technology to solve environmental
problems.”44 The pluralist model is based on broad public input and
agency neutrality—it “is essentially a mechanism for aggregating and
distilling private preferences”45 and is committed to conceptions of
majority rule.46 And, lastly, the civic republican model aspires to focus on
“true public good”47 solutions and calls on people, organizations, and
government to set aside their private preferences to focus “squarely on the
public interest.”48
Over the years, the expertise model has been displaced by pluralist and
civic republican ideals for public participation. From the late nineteenth
to middle twentieth century, public administration in the United States
was dominated by the expertise model. At the turn of the century, for
example, Gifford Pinchot—the first chief of the U.S. Forest Service—
“established a strong managerial ethos” for the new agency.49 Pinchot’s

it derives from the right of affected interests to present facts and arguments to an agency . . . to ensure
the rationality of the agency’s decision.’); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative
Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 359 (1972) (‘[W]hen government agencies are challenged as being
unresponsive to public needs and to the public interest, one “solution” frequently suggested is to
broaden citizen involvement and participation in administrative decision making.’).”).
43. Gauna, supra note 42, at 17.
44. Id.
45. Squillace, supra note 41, at 21–20.
46. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1543 (1988).
47. Gauna, supra note 42, at 17.
48. Squillace, supra note 41, at 21–21. Jody Freeman offered an alternative to civic republicanism
(and notice-and-comment, or “call and response,” rulemaking) in her work on collaborative
governance. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1, 27 (1997). Negotiated decision-making has been used with success for some environmental
decisions. See generally Alejandro Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in
Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007). But, as other scholars point out, negotiated
decision-making can favor the well-organized (especially for national rulemakings). See John
Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory Boards in Environmental
Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 917 (1998). This can make some forms of collaborative governance
fatal to local issues and for environmental justice communities, which often are not as well-organized
as national environmental organizations. Id. at 917–18. Similarly, applying alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) principles to environmental contexts may disadvantage parties with fewer resources
or be underinclusive of the wider public in terms of education, income, race, and gender. See Freeman,
supra, at 75 n.229; see also J. Clarence Davies, Environmental ADR and Public Participation, 34
VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 389, 394, 396 (2000) (discussing failures of ADR, including inadequate
representation of the public).
49. THOMAS C. BEIERLE & JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
2 (2002).
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scientific forestry aimed to maximize social welfare by producing “the
greatest good for the greatest number for the longest time.”50 But the
“myth that science produces truth”51 eventually gave way to the ideals of
pluralism and the modern administrative state.52 Today, according to some
legal scholars, American institutions reflect both pluralist and republican
theories;53 its modern environmental laws, however, are “pluralist-created
and pluralist-driven.”54
Nonetheless, just as democratic pluralism was gaining steam, Sherry
Arnstein—former chief advisor on citizen participation for the U.S.
Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare55—countered that
“participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating
process for the powerless,” namely, the “have-nots.”56 She emphasized
the “critical difference between going through the empty ritual of
participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of
the process.”57 So Arnstein proposed an eight-rung ladder of
participation.58 The bottom rungs (manipulation and therapy) describe
levels of non-participation that enable powerholders (government
agencies, experts, elites) to educate or cure participants without genuine
public participation.59 The middle rungs represent degrees of tokenism
(informing, consulting, and placating) that allow the have-nots to hear and
be heard but offer no assurances that their voices will be heeded.60 The
top rungs (partnership, delegated power, and citizen control) lead to
50. Id.
51. BRUCE A. WILLIAMS & ALBERT R. MATHENY, DEMOCRACY, DIALOGUE, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: THE CONTESTED LANGUAGES OF SOCIAL REGULATION 39 (1995)
(citing DAVID COLLINGRIDGE & COLIN REEVE, SCIENCE SPEAKS TO POWER: THE ROLE OF EXPERTS
IN POLICY MAKING (1986)).
52. Gauna, supra note 42, at 19; see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1684 (1975).
53. Gauna, supra note 42, at 30 (citing Sunstein, supra note 46, at 1561; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 49–58 (1985)).
54. Gauna, supra note 42, at 24 n.81 (discussing Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a
Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.
REV. 981, 981–82 (1994) (observing that environmental law is the result of two paradigm shifts:
(1) the public’s awakening to environmental problems in the early 1960s, and (2) the development of
confrontational, pluralistic citizen activism in area of governance)).
55. Climbing the Ladder: A Look at Sherry R. Arnstein, AM. ASS’N COLLS. OSTEOPATHIC MED.,
https://www.aacom.org/become-a-doctor/financial-aid-and-scholarships/sherry-r-arnstein-minorityscholarship/sherry-arnstein-biography [https://perma.cc/Q8DR-HNM3].
56. Arnstein, supra note 40, at 216. The “have-nots,” as Arnstein might identify them today, are
mostly Black, Indigenous, People of Color (BIPOC) communities.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 217.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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greater power: from negotiating rights to full managerial authority.61
Arnstein’s ladder, which she designed to be provocative, helps illustrate
“that there are significant gradations of citizen participation.”62
Though perhaps intended to be provocative, Arnstein’s thesis falls
comfortably within a broader literature on public participation and
democratic power.63 According to legal scholar Sabeel Rahman, for
political theorists like John Dewey and Progressive Era radicals, the
central challenge of democracy was “the need to rebalance the distribution
of political and economic power.”64 “Contesting domination,” explains
Rahman, “would require engaging more participation, but doing so in a
way that also empowered ordinary people to hold accountable political
and economic elites who might otherwise usurp their authority as the
demos and come to dominate the polity.”65 Put differently, people should
be agents “actively working to gain some degree of control over the
contingencies of modern life,” rather than mere receptors of experience
and knowledge.66
This emphasis on contestation and countervailing power is at the heart
of republican theory and institutional design as well.67 For thinkers like
James Madison, “a central goal of democratic institutional design was to
counteract the dangers of ‘faction’ and of ‘cabals of the few’ by
harnessing the countervailing power of rival factions and groups to
prevent concentrations of political power.”68 By embracing a contestatory
framework—over norms like consensus, deliberation, and
collaboration—democratic institutions “can serve better at activating
more (and more inclusive) participation” and can provide a check on the
concentration of power.69
Unlike in electoral politics, where the public can make their voices
heard at the ballot box, the public’s countervailing power in
61. Id.
62. Id. Founded in 1990, the International Association of Public Participation developed three
pillars for effective public participation: The Spectrum of Public Participation; Core Values; and a
Code of Ethics. The Spectrum—reminiscent of Arnstein’s ladder—provides five elements of
increasing impact, from informing, consulting, involving, collaborating, to empowering. See IAP2
Spectrum of Public Participation, INT’L ASS’N FOR PUB. PARTICIPATION (Nov. 12, 2018),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iap2.org/resource/resmgr/pillars/Spectrum_8.5x11_Print.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FS7F-E235].
63. E.g., K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 22 (2017).
64. Id. at 106.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 109.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 110; see also Daniel E. Walters, The Administrative Agon: A Democratic Theory for a
Conflictual Regulatory State, 132 YALE L.J. __ (forthcoming 2022).
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administrative governance is grounded in judicial review.70 The
Administrative Procedure Act71 (and many substantive statutes, including
the Clean Air Act72), for instance, allows affected members of the public
to challenge regulations and other agency actions in federal court.73
Judges can then strike down these actions for being arbitrary and
capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law.74 Nevertheless, judges
will defer to agency decision-makers when they exercise technical
expertise75 or interpret statutes76 that they administer. Enhancing public
power within administrative governance, accordingly, must be tied to
principles of judicial review—unless the public can better its odds in
court, the intervention will have failed.77
70. Of course, some agency heads, including the EPA Administrator, are directly accountable to
and overseen by elected officials (thus potentially legitimizing regulatory governance). At the same
time, others would argue, insulating technocratic regulators from the political arena can reinforce
democratic ideals (since elected officials delegated powers to the agencies they created in the first
place). See RAHMAN, supra note 6363, at 147–52. Additionally, since agencies are “creatures of
statute,” legislators can augment or restrain agency authorities by enacting or amending laws. And
there is also the Congressional Review Act, which Congress may use to overturn specific rules by
federal agencies. See MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43992,
THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2021),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43992 (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
71. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7675.
73. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (providing a “right of review”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (providing a
right to “judicial review” of “final [agency] action[s]”).
74. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
75. See, e.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (“When
examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing
court must generally be at its most deferential.”); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Super Deference and
Heightened Scrutiny, 74 FLA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2022).
76. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984)
(holding courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute so long as that
interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute).
77. Of course, some procedural justice scholars rely on different measures to gauge success.
Around the time that Arnstein cautioned the shift towards more citizen participation, John Thibaut
and Laurens Walker began to develop procedural justice as a branch of social psychology. THIBAUT
& WALKER, supra note 35. Procedural justice, according to Thibaut and Walker, recognized that
participants in decision-making derived significant satisfaction from the procedures used to arrive at
a decision (separate from any outcome effects). Rick L. Lawrence, Steven E. Daniels & George H.
Stankey, Procedural Justice and Public Involvement in Natural Resource Decision Making, 10 SOC’Y
& NAT. RES. 577, 579 (1997). For example, if procedures are perceived as fair, participants might
reduce dissatisfaction with unfavorable decisions. Id. (citing E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988)). On the other hand, if procedures are
considered unfair, an objectively fair decision might still be judged unfavorably. Lawrence et al.,
supra, at 579 (citing LIND & TYLER, supra).
There are obvious limits to this approach—what seems fair may not in fact be fair. While
“satisfaction” may not be a good proxy for justice, some scholars argue that it also is not a good
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Pluralism, Environmental Decision-Making, and Environmental
Injustice

Environmental
decision-making
is
incredibly
complex
(technologically, scientifically, and economically). And while
environmental laws and administrative procedures provide for notice and
comment decision-making (derided sometimes as “decide, announce, and
defend”78), the vast majority of decisions are technocratic and inaccessible
to lay persons. Nevertheless, principles of administrative law place the
burden on the public to raise issues with reasonable specificity before they
may challenge an agency action.79 This can function as a structural barrier
to judicial review—especially for communities that are under-resourced
and over-burdened.80 This loss of power may lead to a frustrated public
indicator of “success.” Cary Coglianese, Is Satisfaction Success? Evaluating Public Participation in
Regulatory Policymaking (Harv. Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper RWP02-038,
2002),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=331420
[https://perma.cc/ZWA7VNHB]. And when the illusion of fairness fades, some studies found that participants might be less
satisfied even when they had more input into decisions than when they had less. Lawrence et al.,
supra, at 580. This tendency became known as the frustration effect. Id.; see also Emily Hammond,
Public Participation in Risk Regulation: The Flaws of Formality, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 169, 170 & n.6
(citing Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61
DUKE L.J. 1763, 1784–86 (2012)). Though scholars differ as to why it occurs, some theories include
“repeated disappointment in the face of rising expectations” and “social support of the perception that
the outcome is unfair.” Lawrence et al., supra, at 580 (citing LIND & TYLER, supra).
78. Applegate, supra note 48, at 908 (citing MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE
RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN TOXIC AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 132 (1994); NAT’L RSCH.
COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 78 (1996)).
79. It is a general principle of administrative law that “the opportunity to comment is meaningless
unless the agency responds to significant points raised by the public.” Home Box Off., Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted). The trigger for a response though is that
“comments must do more than simply state that the agency’s premises or conclusions are wrong; they
must explain why and on what basis the agency assertedly has erred.” Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA,
988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Home Box Off., 567 F.2d at 35 n.58). There is a
misconception that notice-and-comment decisions are based on “merely tallying individual
preferences,” e.g., Kerry Kumabe, The Public’s Right of Participation: Attaining Environmental
Justice in Hawai’i Through Deliberative Decisionmaking, 17 ASIAN AM. L.J. 181, 182 (2010), which
might explain the appeal to mass commenting, see generally Vanessa Duguay, Views or Votes: The
Challenge of Mass Comments in Rulemaking, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 625 (2018). In recent years,
mass comments have also become a form of participatory fraud. See STEVEN BALLA, REEVE BULL,
BRIDGET DOOLING, EMILY HAMMOND, MICHAEL HERZ, MICHAEL LIVERMORE & BETH SIMONE
NOVECK, REPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: MASS,
COMPUTER-GENERATED, AND FRAUDULENT COMMENTS (2021). Nevertheless, some scholars
propose giving (legitimate) mass comments some measure of meaning. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson,
Should Mass Comments Count?, 2 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 173, 183 (2012) (“[L]arge volumes
of comments should be taken more seriously by agencies. They at least should trigger an agency to
engage in further deliberation and investigation. They should also prompt a brief response in the
rulemaking documents.”).
80. Between 2018 and 2020, as an example, the EPA finalized twenty-seven Clean Air Act
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and ultimately less public participation.81
In the eyes of a decision-maker, lack of participation contributes to
false legitimacy. For routine and noncontroversial decisions, this may not
be problematic. Indeed, EPA purports to use “direct final rulemakings”
(i.e., forgoing notice-and-comment) only when the decisions do not
implicate significant technical or policy choices.82 But sometimes
agencies deliberately propose actions that are legally or technically
deficient and wait to “see if anyone comments.”83 Most people, however,
would not know where to find a proposed rule (let alone know how to
effectively comment on one).84 Marginalized populations, moreover, may
be disproportionately overlooked.85 But if the public waives its right to
comment (or fails to raise an issue “with reasonable specificity”), courts
will insulate agencies from judicial review.86 Alternatively, decisionrulemakings that identified comments “outside the scope of [EPA’s] proposed action” and that “fail
to identify any material issue necessitating a response.” See Comments Failing to Identify Material
Issue,
FED.
REG.,
https://bit.ly/3wAepH1
[https://perma.cc/ZA2L-UUW5]
(search
https://www.federalregister.gov/ for “fail to identify any material issue”; then narrow results to final
rules issued by the EPA). Though many of these comments may have been truly irrelevant, tangential,
incoherent, or even bizarre, comments that express genuine opposition without grappling with the
legal or factual issues presented in the proposal can be ignored for failing to identify a “material
issue.” Accordingly, no change in the rulemaking was required and the action likely could not have
been challenged successfully in court. What’s the point? some commenters might wonder.
81. See infra note 77.
82. See, e.g., SIP Processing Manual, Chapter 6: EPA Decision Options, U.S. ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, https://cfpub.epa.gov/oarwebadmin/sipman/sipman/mContent.cfm?chap=6&filePos=11
[https://perma.cc/ZT8Y-LQ28] (“The direct final rulemaking process is used generally for routine
noncontroversial [state implementation plan] changes”). However, if adverse comment is received,
the final rulemaking must be withdrawn. Id.
83. Telephone Interview with Employee, Env’t Prot. Agency (May 19, 2021).
84. Victor B. Flatt, Michael M. O’Hear, Mark Squillace & Robert R.M. Verchick, Let the People
Speak: Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking (Lessons from the Controversial New Source Review
Proposal of the Clean Air Act), 34 ENV’T L. REP. 10115, 10115 (2004).
85. Gwendolyn McKee, Noticing Notice, YALE J. ON REG. (Aug. 3, 2020),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/noticing-notice-by-gwendolyn-mckee/ [https://perma.cc/L7PJ-EY9W].
And to the extent that notice-and-comment rulemaking transitions more completely to
www.regulations.gov, people without reliable internet service or computers will be disproportionately
affected. See Hansi Lo Wang, Native Americans on Tribal Land Are ‘the Least Connected’ to HighSpeed Internet, NPR (Dec. 6, 2018, 6:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/06/673364305/nativeamericans-on-tribal-land-are-the-least-connected-to-high-speed-internet
[https://perma.cc/KPY4S2L7]; Dian Schaffhauser, Poverty, Race Linked to Lack of Internet for Students, JOURNAL (May 14,
2020),
https://thejournal.com/articles/2020/05/14/poverty-race-linked-to-lack-of-internet-forstudents.aspx [https://perma.cc/6DAG-AE5Q] (discussing Anaya Sen & Catherine E. Tucker, Social
Distancing and School Closures: Documenting Disparity in Internet Access Among School Children
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3572922 [https://perma.cc/
ED7E-2R7A]). Especially, if agency proposals rely on technical support documents that may be
hundreds of pages long and can only be found in the virtual public docket.
86. See, e.g., Mossville Env’t Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
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makers will narrow public input to highly technical and scientific issues,
on which laypersons are generally less equipped to challenge—setting up
what some scholars call an illusion of inclusion.87
C.

Public Participation as Environmental Justice

Against this backdrop, numerous legal scholars propose alternative
models for public participation in environmental decision-making. One
wing advocates for greater collaborative governance.88 The collaborative
model, according to Jody Freeman, is a good fit for environmental
regulation “because technical, data-driven disputes lend themselves to
adaptive solutions, or because the regulated industries in these sectors
have accepted the inevitability of regulation and are willing to discuss
implementation.”89 Building on Freeman’s work, Alejandro Camacho
advocates incorporating collaborative governance strategies to land use
decisions (zoning and the like).90 Negotiated decisions—one example of
collaborative governance—have been used successfully for local
environmental disputes like landfill siting.91 But even proponents of
(“Reasonable specificity requires something more than a general challenge to EPA’s approach.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (“Only an objection to a rule
or procedure which was raised with reasonable specificity during the period for public comment
(including any public hearing) may be raised during judicial review.”). Although procedural errors
are normally reviewable by a court, section 307 of the Clean Air Act restricts courts from invalidating
certain rules unless “the errors were so serious and related to matters of such central relevance to the
rule that there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if such
errors had not been made.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(8) (applying this limitation to rules that are covered
by section 307(d)).
87. See generally Roger Few, Katrina Brown & Emma L. Tompkins, Public Participation and
Climate Change Adaptation: Avoiding the Illusion of Inclusion, 7 CLIMATE POL’Y 46 (2007).
88. Closely related to collaborative governance is the use of environmental alternative dispute
resolution, or ADR. ADR, broadly conceived, “includes mediation, policy dialogues, and negotiated
settlements (including regulatory negotiation).” Davies, supra note 48, at 390. ADR is not, however,
best viewed as a form of public participation, and it carries the same limitations associated with
collaborative models discussed above. See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., NOT IN MY BACKYARD:
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,898 AND TITLE VI AS TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 98–
119 (2003).
89. Freeman, supra note 48, at 97–98. Collaborative governance may also be useful in other
complex decision-making scenarios (for instance, algorithmic decision-making). See generally
Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic
Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529 (2019).
90. See generally Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions
(Installment One), 24 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 3 (2005); Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing
Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive
Planning in Land Use Decisions (Installment Two), 24 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 269 (2005).
91. Applegate, supra note 48, at 915; see also James E. McGuire, The Dilemma of Public
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negotiation recognize that some collaborative efforts have fallen short of
their goals (notably, for developing Habitat Conservation Plans under the
Endangered Species Act92).93
Critics of collaborative decision-making point out that such models can
be problematic for some communities.94 Indeed, collaborative governance
can “perpetuate or even exaggerate resource and power imbalances
among interested parties” and may even “constitute an expensive
additional layer of procedure, since they do not do away with the reviewand-comment opportunity of anybody to challenge the final outcome.”95
For the unorganized, poorly-resourced, and technically-unsophisticated,
especially, collaboration can be fatal.96
A second wing suggests the use of citizen advisory groups, proxy
advocates, or regulatory contrarians.97 These groups can function as
boundary organizations98 to help broker knowledge between technocratic
decision-makers and community members.99 And they can operate as
quasi-independent voices—a potential source of countervailing power.100
To be sure, augmenting the traditional notice-and-comment process with
Participation in Facility Siting Decisions and the Mediation Alternative, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
467, 472–73 (1985).
92. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544.
93. See Camacho, supra note 48, at 295–98; see also Lawrence Susskind, Alejandro E. Camacho
& Todd Schenk, A Critical Assessment of Collaborative Adaptive Management in Practice, 49 J.
APPLIED ECOLOGY 47 (2012) (assessing collaborative adaptive management of scarce natural
resources).
94. Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26 HARV. ENV’T L.
REV. 459, 497 (2002).
95. Applegate, supra note 48, at 918 (footnotes omitted).
96. Id. at 917.
97. See id. at 901; RAHMAN, supra note 63, at 155; Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz,
Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1629 (2011).
98. See Thomas F. Gieryn, Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science:
Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, 48 AM. SOCIO. REV. 781, 782 (1983)
(describing the boundary-work of scientists as a type of “public science,” in which scientists explain
science to the public and political authorities).
99. See, e.g., Karin M. Gustafsson & Rolf Lidskog, Boundary Organizations and Environmental
Governance: Performance, Institutional Design, and Conceptual Development, 19 CLIMATE RISK
MGMT. 1, 1–2 (2018) (describing the concept of boundary organization as specific organizational
efforts to mediate between science and policy); see also S. Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks and
Boundary Organizations in Coproduction: A Short History of a Decision-Support Tool and Model
for Adapting Multiuse Reservoir and Water-Energy Governance to Climate Change in California, 11
WEATHER, CLIMATE, & SOC’Y 823, 844 (2019) (concluding that coequal status of researchers and
community is important for coproduced science).
100. RAHMAN, supra note 63, at 155 (recognizing that “quasi-independent voices like ombudsmen
within agencies . . . can force decision-makers to address blind spots, challenge assumptions,
counteract other forms of disparate influence, and help magnify the voice of particularly
underrepresented groups”).
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such groups can serve important functions—they may be used effectively,
for example, to ensure ongoing compliance with environmental
requirements101 (discussed more in section III.B)—but they are not
intended to displace traditional public participation. To suggest otherwise,
as some scholars acknowledge, could bar community advocates from
successfully challenging any final decisions.102 Proxy advocacy also has
limits where community opinions are not necessarily pre-determined or
uniform. While a proxy advocacy approach might presume that
communities want to maximize pollution reductions regardless of cost,
some local positions may in fact be more nuanced or complicated—
particularly if employment opportunities are more limited and tied to
particular industries.
Finally, environmental justice scholar Eileen Gauna argues that the
three governance models create an environmental justice misfit, by failing
to “effectively incorporate an important form of public participation in
decision-making—the participation by communities bearing the greatest
environmental risks.”103 Indeed, as Arnstein observed, when BIPOC
communities—who are disproportionately impacted by environmental
harms—advocate for participation, “the American consensus on the
fundamental principle [of public participation] explodes into many shades
of outright racial, ethnic, ideological, and political opposition.”104 Thus,
Gauna suggests, only by shifting the agency neutrality paradigm to nonneutral intervention on behalf of marginalized communities, “can justice
claims surface, survive, and thrive.”105
Gauna’s recommendation focuses on three avenues of public
participation: advisory committees, notice-and-comment decisions, and
informal public participation.106 In each of these avenues, the same
vulnerability is called out—inclusion alone is not sufficient; the technical
orientation of environmental decision-making disadvantages underresourced community advocates.107 “[B]y recognizing that the
inaccessible discourse of experts and the short-sighted vision of pluralism
serve to disempower and exclude, the agency official can help the
environmental justice vision by promoting the equal status of community
101. Id. (discussing reforms to institutionalize countervailing power in the monitoring and
enforcement stage of regulation).
102. Luke W. Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and Grassroots Activists: Three Models
of Environmental Advocacy, 14 VA. ENV’T L.J. 687, 702–03 (1995).
103. Gauna, supra note 42, at 5.
104. Arnstein, supra note 40, at 216.
105. Gauna, supra note 42, at 72.
106. Id. at 57.
107. Id. at 64–65, 69.
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participants.”108 Non-neutrality, Gauna argues, “requires a commitment to
equalize resources to educate community residents about applicable legal
requirements and technical issues” and would transform the agency into
“a promoter of environmental justice.”109
Common among the suggested alternatives to traditional public
participation is a genuine interest in aiding and empowering communities
that may want to participate in decisions that impact their lived
experiences. Perhaps more importantly, however, none of the suggestions
adequately address the underlying power imbalances among stakeholders
and decisionmakers, nor would they displace traditional notice-andcomment rulemaking.110 These shortcomings are particularly acute when
regulatory decisions are focused on highly technical determinations (like
selecting the best pollution controls). And, the next Part highlights, this
can have significant impacts on the quality of life and health of
marginalized frontline communities.
II.

AIR POLLUTION AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
CONCERN

Environmental justice observers often identify the 1982 Warren
County, North Carolina protests as the birth of the movement.111 Since
then, most environmental justice investigations and scholarship have
focused on the disproportionate impacts faced by people of color—and
Black communities in particular—associated with the siting of hazardous

108. Id. at 70–71.
109. Id. at 71.
110. In fact, Gauna later wrote that “[o]ne of the lessons that [environmental justice] activists have
learned in the last decade is that—however appropriate is the ethical force of their positions—to be
effective, they must also engage and participate in the process at its most technical level.” Eileen
Gauna, An Essay on Environmental Justice: The Past, the Present, and Back to the Future, 42 NAT.
RES. J. 701, 709 (2002).
111. Luke W. Cole & Sheila R. Foster, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND
RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 19–33 (2000). In 1982, a predominantly
black community staged a protest to keep a hazardous waste landfill—intended to accept cancercausing polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)-contaminated soils—away from their homes. Apparently, at
the time, federal law exempted the siting of PCB-disposal sites from public input requirements. See
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983). The
protest drew attention to the environmental and health burdens born by African American and other
marginalized communities across the United States (even if residents were unsuccessful in blocking
the landfill). See COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUST., UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTE AND RACE
IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF.,
supra; see also ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN POSTWAR AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY READER 5–10
(Christopher W. Wells ed. 2018).
THE
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waste dumps or the cleanup of contaminated sites.112 In 1987, for instance,
the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice published the
first national study that found a correlation between the number of
hazardous waste facilities and the percentage of nonwhite community
members.113 Numerous studies have only underscored the findings of the
United Church of Christ report and even identified links between
government action and discriminatory impacts.114
A.

Air Pollution Health Disparities

More recently, attention has shifted towards air pollution.115 People of
color are disproportionately affected by nearly every category of sources
of fine particulate matter, or PM2.5—the largest environmental cause of
human mortality in the United States (even controlling for other factors
such as their state or income level).116 Fine particles, which are regulated
112. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 111, at 3 (finding that Black communities who
lived in states served by EPA Region 4 (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and six Tribes) were more likely found near offsite hazardous
waste landfill sites than other racial or ethnic communities).
113. COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUST., supra note 111.
114. See, e.g., DORCETA TAYLOR, TOXIC COMMUNITIES: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, INDUSTRIAL
POLLUTION, AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 33–46 (2014) (documenting studies on racism and
discrimination in siting decisions and discussing skeptics, including Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got
to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL
L. REV. 1001 (1993)); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and
Class as Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 931 (1992)
(reviewing sixteen such studies); ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 32–36 (3d ed. 2000) (documenting waste facility siting disparities); and
Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Expanding Public
Participation in the Federal Superfund Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 671, 672–73 (1994) (noting
that “more than ninety percent of the population of African Americans live near an uncontrolled toxic
waste site” and explaining that “findings not only show that people of color are differentially affected
by pollution, but that they can also expect different treatment by the government.”)); see also
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT
SEGREGATED AMERICA 54–57 (2017) (discussing discriminatory zoning practices and the siting of
polluting industry and toxic waste plants in African American communities).
115. Richard L. Revesz, Air Pollution and Environmental Justice, 49 ECOLOGY L.Q. __
(forthcoming 2022).
116. Juliet Eilperin & Darryl Fears, Deadly Air Pollutant ‘Disproportionately and Systematically’
Harms Americans of Color, Study Finds, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2021, 2:00 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/04/28/environmental-justice-pollution/
[https://perma.cc/6V5Y-4JK3]; Christopher W. Tessum, David A. Paolella, Sarah E. Chambliss,
Joshua S. Apte, Jason D. Hill & Julian D. Marshall, PM2.5 Polluters Disproportionately and
Systemically Affect People of Color in the United States, SCI. ADVANCES (Apr. 18, 2021),
https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/7/18/eabf4491 (last visited Apr. 10, 2022). Other air
pollutants, such as those associated with childhood development and cancer, are also emitted more
around at-risk lower-income communities of color. See Kimberly A. Terrell & Gianna St. Julien,
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by the EPA under the Clean Air Act, are at least thirty times smaller than
the average human hair and can get deep into your lungs and even into
your bloodstream.117 Several studies link particle pollution to premature
death, heart attacks and irregular heartbeat, aggravated asthma, and
decreased lung function/increased respiratory symptoms.118 Long-term
exposure to PM2.5 is also a significant factor in higher COVID-19
mortality rates; in fact, one study “found that an increase of just one
microgram per cubic meter of air (µg/m3) of county PM2.5 levels
corresponded to a 15% increase in that county’s COVID-19 death rate.”119
Some particulate matter is emitted directly into the air as soot (from

Toxic Air Pollution Is Linked to Higher Cancer Rates Among Impoverished Communities in
Louisiana, 17 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS 1 (2022), https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/17489326/ac4360/pdf [https://perma.cc/5TA5-F3FG]; see also BEN KUNTSMAN, ERIC SCHAEFFER &
ALEXANDRA SHAYKEVICH, ENV’T INTEGRITY PROJECT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND REFINERY
POLLUTION: BENZENE MONITORING AROUND OIL REFINERIES SHOWED MORE COMMUNITIES AT
RISK IN 2020 (2021), https://environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/BenzeneReport-embargoed-for-4.29.21-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB5X-X5VA]. I am mindful that discourse
around pollution and disability can be discriminatory as discussed in disability justice literature. See
Agents of Change in Environmental Justice, Krystal Vasquez’s Push for Disability Inclusion in STEM,
ENV’T HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 21, 2021), https://www.ehn.org/disability-inclusion-in-stem2650512380/krystal-vasquez [https://perma.cc/M26F-VHV4]; Catherine Jampel, Intersections of
Disability Justice, Racial Justice and Environmental Justice, ENV’T SOCIO. (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://par.nsf.gov/servlets/purl/10058562 [https://perma.cc/SHF9-XD6G]. I do not intend to ignore
ableist critiques; rather, I wish only to point out that there are other pollutants of concern beyond
particulates.
117. Particulate Matter (PM) Basics, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/pmpollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics [https://perma.cc/Q9KX-P4V5]. Compared to PM2.5, ultrafine
particles (PM0.1 or UFPs) may pose an even greater risk to human health. And many of the same
groups that are at heighted risk to PM2.5 are similarly sensitive to UFP exposure. See ELMER DIAZ,
KOENRAAD MARIËN, LILLIAN MANAHAN & JULIE FOX, WASH. STATE DEP’T HEALTH, SUMMARY OF
HEALTH
RESEARCH
ON
ULTRAFINE
PARTICLES
(2019),
https://www.doh.wa.gov/
Portals/1/Documents/4000/334-454.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X4P-XTNK]. To date, the EPA does not
believe a distinct standard for UFPs is scientifically supported, and instead relies on the PM2.5
indicator to provide protection for particles that are less than or equal to 2.5 micrometers in diameter.
Richard W. Baldauf, Robert B. Devlin, Peter Gehr, Robert Giannelli, Beth Hassett-Sipple, Heejung
Jung, Giorgio Martini, Joseph McDonald, Jason D. Sacks & Katherine Walker, Ultrafine Particle
Metrics and Research Considerations: Review of the 2015 UFP Workshop, 13 INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH.
& PUB. HEALTH 1054 (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5129264/
[https://perma.cc/Z6Z2-VEKL].
118. Health and Environmental Effects of Particulate Matter (PM), U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/health-and-environmental-effects-particulate-matter-pm
[https://perma.cc/UAG8-J5UQ].
119. Anaya Bhattacharya, COVID-19 Reveals Environmental Justice Gaps in National
Environmental Policy, ENV’T L. INST. (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.eli.org/vibrant-environmentblog/covid-19-reveals-environmental-justice-gaps-national-environmental-policy [https://perma.cc/
LB7Y-A3SB] (citing XIAO WU, RACHEL C. NETHERY, M. BENJAMIN SABATH, DANIELLE BRAUN &
FRANCESCA DOMINICI, EXPOSURE TO AIR POLLUTION AND COVID-19 MORTALITY IN THE UNITED
STATES (2020), https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/covid-pm/files/pm_and_covid_mortality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RZ8H-NJ3U]).
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cars, trucks, heavy equipment, forest fires, and burning waste), but most
of it forms in the atmosphere from gases like sulfates and nitrates (from
power generation and vehicle exhaust).120 And while particles can be
transported hundreds of miles and across state lines,121 pollution hotspots
can also form around heavily trafficked roads and industrial facilities
leading to “small ‘microclimates’ that contain levels of deadly pollutants
that can far exceed federal standards.”122 These hotspots, unsurprisingly,
are often home to low-income communities and communities of color.123
Although income is certainly a factor in increased particulate exposure,
income differences do not explain away the disproportionate racial
impacts of air pollution. Numerous studies have documented “higherthan-average air pollution exposures for racial/ethnic minority
populations and lower-income populations in the United States, leading
to disparities in attributable health impacts.”124 More recently, a
December 2021 study found that “racial/ethnic exposure disparities” were
not “‘merely’ a reflection of income disparities . . . .”125 And while the
study confirmed that “[r]egulations . . . have achieved substantial
reductions in the concentrations of many pollutants,” racial and ethnic
exposure disparities continued to persist.126
The regulatory framework designed to address air quality in the United
120. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, THE PARTICLE POLLUTION REPORT: CURRENT UNDERSTANDING
AIR
QUALITY
AND
EMISSIONS
THROUGH
2003
at
6
(2004),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-11/documents/pp_report_2003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JH2B-G7EX].
OF

121. See, e.g., Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Dir., Off. of Air Quality Plan. & Standards,
Env’t Prot. Agency, to Reg’l Air Div. Dirs. et al., Regions 1–10, Env’t Prot. Agency (Mar. 17, 2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-08/documents/good-neighbor-memo_implementation.
pdf [https://perma.cc/R79B-84B4] (identifying pollution links across the country between downwind
receptors and upwind contributors).
122. Ann E. Carlson, The Clean Air Act’s Blind Spot: Microclimates and Hotspot Pollution, 65
UCLA L. REV. 1036, 1036 (2018). Carlson concludes that one of the most effective strategies to
reducing hotspot pollution may be the electrification of the transportation fleet, which appears
increasingly likely over the next decade. Id. at 1078–81; see also Jeffrey Ball, The Electrification of
the Auto Industry Is Speeding Up—and Shaking Up the Energy Economy, FORTUNE (Feb. 16, 2021,
2:20 AM), https://fortune.com/2021/02/16/auto-industry-climate-change-electric-cars-gm-generalmotors-exxon-mobil-green/ [https://perma.cc/8WF3-LF3G]. Some researchers warn, however, that
non-exhaust particulate emissions might increase as a result. See Victor R.J.H. Timmers & Peter A.J.
Achten, Non-Exhaust PM Emissions from Electric Vehicles, 134 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 10, 10 (2016).
123. Carlson, supra note 122, at 1047.
124. Jiawen Liu, Lara P. Clark, Matthew J. Bechle, Anjum Hajat, Sun-Young Kim, Allen L.
Robinson, Lianne Sheppard, Adam A. Szpiro & Julian D. Marshall, Disparities in Air Pollution
Exposure in the United States by Race/Ethnicity and Income, 1990–2010, 129 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS.
127005-1, 127005-1 (2021), https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/epdf/10.1289/EHP8584 [https://perma.cc/
A3LQ-2WAD].
125. Id. at 127005-12.
126. Id. at 127005-12 to 127005-13.
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States is structured around a handful of core principles. In the following
sections, I present an overview of federal air quality regulation—
summarizing the core principles and programs of the Clean Air Act—and
discuss some of the environmental justice implications of Clean Air Act
implementation, namely the technocratic nature of pollution control
decisions. This Part highlights the importance of public participation in
air quality decision-making (including the numerous opportunities for
participation). It also underscores the necessity of technical assistance to
provide meaningful input to complex air quality decisions.
B.

Principles of Clean Air Act Regulation

Federal regulation of air quality and pollution control began in earnest
with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.127 Previously, federal
legislation focused mainly on funding state research and training.128 The
1970 Amendments, however, established a comprehensive federal regime
for addressing different types and sources of pollution—namely, criteria
pollutants versus air toxics129 and stationary sources (power plants,
industrial factories) versus mobile sources (cars, trucks). This regime has
largely held through significant amendments to the Clean Air Act in
1977130 and 1990131; although some notable additions include the
Regional Haze Program (1977) and the Acid Rain Program (1990).132
127. See William L. Andreen, Of Fables and Federalism: A Re-Examination of the Historical
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 42 ENV’T L. 627, 655, 658–59 (2012).
128. Arthur C. Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32 J. AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL ASS’N 44, 48–55 (1982).
129. Criteria pollutants are considered “common air pollutants” because they are found all over
the United States and come from a diverse mix of sources (stationary and mobile). Managing Air
Quality – Air Pollutant Types, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/air-qualitymanagement-process/managing-air-quality-air-pollutant-types#com
[https://perma.cc/5RYJUALQ]. Air toxics, also known as hazardous air pollutants, are known or suspected to cause cancer
or other serious health effects, or adverse environmental effects and are often emitted by specific
source categories. What Are Hazardous Air Pollutants?, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/haps/what-are-hazardous-air-pollutants [https://perma.cc/723F-VENQ]. The
1970 amendments recognized that some pollutants were neither common nor hazardous, and
authorized EPA to take some steps towards their regulation too. See, e.g., State Plans for the Control
of Certain Pollutants from Existing Facilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,340, 53,340 (Nov. 17, 1975)
(identifying a “third category” of pollutants that may be harmful to public health or welfare but are
not controlled under the criteria pollutant or hazardous air pollutant programs).
130. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.
131. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.
132. An outlier to this scheme is Title VI of the Clean Air Act, which governs stratospheric ozone
protection and helps implement the United States’ commitment to the Montreal Protocol. See Ozone
Protection Under Title VI of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ozone-layer-protection/ozone-protection-under-title-vi-clean-air-act [https://
perma.cc/AT6G-HU47].
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As popularly described, the Clean Air Act is organized around the
principle of “cooperative federalism.”133 This means that “air pollution
control . . . is the primary responsibility of States and local governments,”
but that federal leadership “is essential for the development of cooperative
Federal, State, regional, and local programs to prevent and control air
pollution.”134 The core embodiment of this principle is the Clean Air Act’s
criteria pollutant program, known as the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) program.
Under the NAAQS program, the EPA identifies pollutants that are
present in the “ambient air”135 and result from numerous or diverse mobile
or stationary sources.136 Six such pollutants have been identified so far:
carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, particle pollution (both
PM2.5 and PM10), and sulfur dioxide.137 Once a pollutant is identified, the
EPA sets two types of national standards—the primary standard is based
on protecting public health, and the secondary standard is based on
protecting welfare (such as decreased visibility and damage to animals,
crops, vegetation, and buildings).138
After the EPA sets a new NAAQS or revises an existing one, the agency
designates areas around the country as meeting (in attainment) or
exceeding (in nonattainment) the standard.139 After designations take
effect, state and local governments must develop implementation plans
(called State Implementation Plans, or SIPs) that detail how the areas will
attain and maintain the standards by reducing and controlling
emissions.140 These plans are put out for public comment and then
submitted to the EPA for review and approval (or disapproval). Consistent
133. See Jonathan Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? Coercion,
Cooperative Federalism and Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671,
672 (2016).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 7401.
135. 40 C.F.R. § 50.1(e) (2021) (defining “ambient air” as “that portion of the atmosphere, external
to buildings, to which the general public has access”).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1).
137. NAAQS Table, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqstable [https://perma.cc/7XGN-6MAX].
138. Id.
139. NAAQS Designations Process, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-airpollutants/naaqs-designations-process [https://perma.cc/LK68-DMFN]. Some areas may also be
“unclassifiable” but are considered in “attainment” for planning purposes. Id.
140. Id. SIPs generally fall into three categories: state-adopted control measures (either state laws
or regulations or source-specific requirements); “non-regulatory” components (such as emissions
inventories, monitoring networks, permitting programs, contingency measures, etc.); and additional
requirements required under section 110 or Part D of the Clean Air Act. See Basic Information About
Air Quality SIPs, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sips/basic-information-airquality-sips [https://perma.cc/V7ZW-WCTK].
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with the Administrative Procedure Act, the EPA’s proposed action is also
put out for public comment before finalization. Finalized actions are
reviewable in one of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.141
Though each state retains considerable discretion “to adopt whatever
mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular
situation,”142 the Clean Air Act becomes increasingly prescriptive for
regulating major sources of air pollution (based on the type and amount
of emissions) and for areas that fail to show progress towards cleaner air.
For example, all SIPs must include a preconstruction permitting program
for stationary sources in areas covered by the plan as necessary to assure
that the NAAQS are achieved.143 These programs are generally called new
source review (NSR) permitting.
There are three types of NSR permitting: Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) permits for new or modified major sources in
attainment areas; nonattainment NSR permits for new or modified major
sources in nonattainment areas; and minor source permits. PSD permits
require installation of the best available control technology (BACT),144 an
air quality analysis of current and predicted conditions, and public
involvement.145 Nonattainment NSR permits, meanwhile, require

141. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b).
142. Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975). But see State Implementation
Plans: Response to Petition for Rulemaking; Restatement and Update of EPA’s SSM Policy
Applicable to SIPs; Findings of Substantial Inadequacy; and SIP Calls to Amend Provisions Applying
to Excess Emissions During Periods of Startup, Shutdown and Malfunction, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,840,
33,878 (June 12, 2015) [hereinafter SSM SIP Call] (explaining that “EPA has the statutory
responsibility to assure that state SIPs meet the specific requirements of the [Clean Air Act], not
merely that they provide for attainment of the NAAQS regardless of whether they meet other
mandatory legal requirements”).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(C).
144. BACT is based on the maximum degree of control that can be achieved, considering energy,
environmental, and economic factors. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). The process for identifying BACT is
generally conducted through a multi-step, “top-down” analysis. In short, the top-down process calls
for all available control measures for a given pollutant to be identified and ranked in descending order
of control effectiveness. The permit applicant should first examine the highest-ranked (“top”) option.
The top-ranked options should be established as BACT unless the permit applicant demonstrates to
the satisfaction of the permitting authority that technical considerations, or energy, environmental, or
economic impacts justify a conclusion that the top-ranked control strategy is not “achievable” in that
case. If the most effective control strategy is eliminated, then the next most effective option should
be evaluated, and so on, until an option is selected as BACT. See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, NEW
SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL: PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND
NONATTAINMENT AREA PERMITTING (DRAFT) B-2
(1990),
https://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/1990wman.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML9R-JH62].
145. Prevention of Significant Deterioration Basic Information, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/nsr/prevention-significant-deterioration-basic-information
[https://perma.cc/3GHM-7BVZ].
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implementation of the lowest achievable emission rate146 and public
involvement.147 Finally, minor sources—those that do not trigger either
PSD or nonattainment NSR—are subject to more discretionary statedeveloped programs.148 Nevertheless, minor NSR programs must ensure
that the construction or modification of these smaller sources will not
result in a violation of any control strategies in the SIP or interfere with
attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS.149 All permitting programs
authorize the use of air quality modeling.150
The cooperative, state-driven model of regulation is reflected in other
Clean Air Act programs as well. For example, the Regional Haze Program
requires states to adopt plans to reduce pollutants that damage visibility in
national parks and other protected areas,151 and Clean Air Act
section 111(d) requires states to adopt plans to control existing sources of
certain pollutants that are not regulated under the NAAQS program or
considered a hazardous air pollutant (i.e., an air toxic).152 In contrast to
these programs, air toxics are primarily regulated by the EPA (although
states can seek a delegation of EPA’s authorities to implement and enforce
national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants, i.e.,
NESHAPs).153
All major sources of pollution must obtain an operating permit, called
a Title V permit.154 These permits are renewed every five years and must
incorporate all applicable Clean Air Act requirements, including any
monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements, any
preconstruction permitting requirements (such as installation of BACT or
implementation of LAER), and any applicable national standards (such as

146. That is the lowest rate reflected in the SIP of any State or the most stringent limit achieved in
practice for such a source (cost, therefore, is not a factor). See 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3).
147. Prevention of Significant Deterioration Basic Information, supra note 145.
148. Minor NSR Basic Information, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/nsr/minornsr-basic-information [https://perma.cc/A3LN-KPCK].
149. Id.
150. Generally, applications of air quality modeling must be based on approved models, data bases,
and other requirements in EPA’s Guideline on Air Quality Models, but modifications or substitutions
may be authorized upon written approval by the EPA Administrator. 40 C.F.R. § 51.160(f)(1)–(2)
(2021). This is discussed further infra section II.D.
151. Regional Haze Program, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
visibility/regional-haze-program [https://perma.cc/B9YX-2VQ8].

https://www.epa.gov/

152. See Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914, 930–32 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
153. Delegation of Clean Air Act Authority, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/caapermitting/delegation-clean-air-act-authority [https://perma.cc/Z8LX-KDU5].
154. Basic Information About Operating Permits, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/title-v-operating-permits/basic-information-about-operating-permits
[https://perma.cc/LQL8-WHEX].
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NESHAPs).155 Every state has an EPA-approved Title V permitting
program, which means a state or local agency will be the primary
permitting authority under Title V.156 Each time a permit is to be issued
(including renewals), permitting authorities are required to solicit public
comment before sending the permit to the EPA.157 The EPA then has
forty-five days to object to the permit for failing to comply with any
federal requirements, before the public can petition the Administrator of
the EPA to block issuance of the permit or revoke it until the permit has
been revised to cure the deficiency.158
The EPA is one of the most active federal regulatory agencies, and
Clean Air Act regulations dominate the agency’s docket. Based on my
review of the Federal Register, over the last ten years, in fact, no less than
57% of proposed EPA rulemakings referenced the Clean Air Act (and
most years that figure hovered around 65%).159 Of those proposals, over
70% also referred to implementation plans.160
Table 1
Publications in the Federal Register
Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

Total
Proposals
379
473
478
402
443
472
425
415
418
447
377

Proposals referencing
the “Clean Air Act”
216
302
318
261
269
303
276
277
290
308
248

Proposals also referring to
“implementation plan”
155
232
273
222
211
256
235
222
231
247
213

By contrast, the EPA has estimated that permitting authorities
155. Id.
156. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 70 app. A.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b).
159. See Table 1. Some rules may have merely referenced the Clean Air Act without being
promulgated under that act’s authority. That number is believed to be very small.
160. Id.
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process approximately 800 PSD preconstruction permits and 14,700
Title V operating permits each year.161 Minor source preconstruction
permits may also be numerous, but less complex: some permits take the
form of a simple registration statement whereas others need a more
fulsome analysis (e.g., synthetic minor sources might include a negotiated
cap on emissions and modeling analyses to show that the source is under
the major source threshold). In short, there are hundreds if not thousands
of potentially relevant decisions that communities could engage with—
far more than in any other area of environmental regulation.162
C.

Air Regulation and Opportunities for Environmental Justice

To date, despite its immense importance to the lives of many
marginalized communities and its relative size within the regulatory
landscape, scholars have largely overlooked citizen advocacy in the
context of air quality permitting decisions and standard setting. There is a
robust literature critiquing and advocating for different participation
models in the siting163 of hazardous waste sites, by contrast.164 There is
161. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed.
Reg. 31,514, 31,557–63 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71); see also Util.
Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 323 (2014).
162. For purposes of comparison, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has authorized on average of
63,000 activities per year between 2012 and 2015, but 97% of those were authorized by nationwide
and other general permits that do not require public notice (meaning just under 1,900 activities
triggered individual permits). NICOLE T. CARTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-223, THE ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS’ NATIONWIDE PERMITS PROGRAM: ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2017).
Similarly, according to EPA estimates, about 6,700 major facilities were subject to the Clean Water
Act’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program (or NPDES permitting) as of
September 30, 2007. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT
DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM (NPDES) PROGRAM 16, https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/
academy/courses/wqstandards/materials/npdes_permits_compliance/overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U22B-Q5V3].
163. For the sake of clarity, I do not refer to siting decisions as permitting decisions, which instead
concerns the selection and operation of pollution controls for new and existing sources.
164. See generally Luke W. Cole, The Theory and Reality of Community-Based Environmental
Decisionmaking: The Failure of California’s Tanner Act and Its Implications for Environmental
Justice, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 733 (1999); Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive
Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice
Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 775 (1998); Applegate, supra note 48; Cole, supra note 102; Bradford
C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can
Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster?, 19 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 239 (1991); Peter
M. Sandman, Getting to Maybe: Some Communications Aspects of Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities,
9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 437 (1985); James E. McGuire, The Dilemma of Public Participation in
Facility Siting Decisions and the Mediation Alternative, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 467 (1985); Gail
Bingham & Daniel S. Miller, Prospects for Resolving Hazardous Waste Siting Disputes Through
Negotiation, 17 NAT. RES. L. 473 (1984); see also RCRA Expanded Public Participation, 60 Fed.
Reg. 63,417 (1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 124, 270) (requiring earlier opportunities for public
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ample evidence and scholarship addressing the under-enforcement of
environmental laws affecting marginalized and low-income
communities.165 However, the few scholars that take a closer look at
environmental permitting only advocate for greater EPA assessment of
environmental justice166 or otherwise conclude that the majority of heavy
polluters are already permitted and can avoid more stringent
environmental controls.167 But what these and other scholars do not do is
treat air quality permitting (and control technology determinations more
generally) as an area in which empowered citizen involvement could pay
important and meaningful dividends.
Perhaps consistent with the evolution of the environmental justice
movement, early environmental law scholarship began by focusing “on
the need to apply civil rights law to decisions made by government
officials” under environmental laws.168 Legal scholars Richard Lazarus
and Steph Tai helped shift the discussion by exploring the extent to which
federal and state permitting agencies could either condition environmental
permits or deny permits altogether on environmental justice grounds.169
In Integrating Environmental Justice into EPA Permitting Authority,
Lazarus and Tai identify three concerns that could be addressed through
permit conditions—promoting community enforcement capacity,
accounting for risk aggregation, and redressing risk disproportionality.170
They conclude that “[e]xisting federal laws provide . . . permitting
agencies with substantial authority to address environmental justice
concerns in their permitting decisions.”171 Indeed, some laws provide
direct authority to address fairness and public health concerns; others
“simply include broadly worded provisions that provide the permitting
involvement in the permitting of facilities that store, treat, or dispose of hazardous waste under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
165. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 98–122 (discussing disparate enforcement of
environmental laws, including penalties for violations and pace of cleanup). See generally Eileen
Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to
Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1995); Richard J. Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion
of Environmental Justice, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1994); Marianne Lavelle & Marcia
Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, 15 NAT’L L.J. S2 (1992);
Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental
Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787 (1993).
166. Richard J. Lazarus & Steph Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice into EPA Permitting
Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 617, 618 (1999).
167. See generally Michael B. Gerrard, The Role of Existing Environmental Laws in the
Environmental Justice Movement, 9 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 555 (1994).
168. Lazarus & Tai, supra note 166, at 618.
169. Id. at 619.
170. Id. at 624.
171. Id. at 677.
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agency with considerable discretion to take the needs of environmental
justice communities into account.”172
Recognizing that authorities can consider environmental justice in
permitting is an important step. In fact, in 2011, the EPA published a
roadmap—Plan EJ 2014—for integrating environmental justice into its
programs and policies, including environmental permitting.173 Yet—
according to sociologist Jill Lindsey Harrison—bureaucratic inertia at the
EPA (and likely other regulatory agencies) routinely resists, undermines,
and disparages environmental justice reform.174 This reaction is based on
beliefs like:
“(1) environmental protection is colorblind, (2) bettering the
environment overall . . . improve[s] [it] for everyone, (3) [the]
EPA is a science agency while [environmental justice] deals with
social issues, and (4) other ‘standard narratives’ rooted generally
in American normative societal values or in long-held premises
that have shaped the environmental protection field for
decades.175
“We do ecology, not sociology,” is the standard retort cited by Harrison;
“EPA deals with issues of technology,” recounts senior environmental
justice advisor Charles Lee.176
While Congress has failed to authorize expressly EPA’s consideration
of environmental justice as a permitting element, state governments have
been perhaps more willing to do so. In 2020, for example, New Jersey
adopted an historic bill that requires the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection to evaluate environmental and public health
impacts from certain classes of facilities on “overburdened” communities

172. Id. at 677.
173. See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN PERMITTING
(2011), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100ETRR.PDF?Dockey=P100ETRR.PDF [https://
perma.cc/775K-TSL9].
174. See generally JILL LINDSEY HARRISON, FROM THE INSIDE OUT: THE FIGHT FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE WITHIN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (2019).
175. Charles Lee, Confronting Disproportionate Impacts and Systemic Racism in Environmental
Policy, 51 ENV’T L. REP. 10207, 10208 (2021).
176. Id. at 10209 n.11 (citing Lena Williams, Race Bias Found in Location of Toxic Dumps, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/16/us/race-bias-found-in-location-oftoxic-dumps.html [https://perma.cc/3H84-9PQL]). Though currently with the EPA, Charles Lee is
also known for his work as the principal author of the 1987 United Church of Christ report that found
a correlation between the number of hazardous waste facilities and the percentage of nonwhite
community members. COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUST., supra note 111; Brooks Berndt, “A True Game
Changer”: Toxic Wastes and Race 30 Years Later – An Interview with Charles Lee, UNITED CHURCH
OF CHRIST: THE POLLINATOR (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.ucc.org/pollinator_an_interview_
with_charles_lee/ [https://perma.cc/2CV5-D84C].
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when reviewing permit applications.177 With the new law, New Jersey
became the first state “to require mandatory permit denials if an
environmental justice analysis determines a new facility will have a
disproportionately negative impact on overburdened communities.”178
Despite the importance of government intervention, “[t]he engine that
drives environmental justice is empowered communities, not enlightened
officials.”179 In fact, a central tenet of the environmental justice movement
is that “we speak for ourselves.”180 While Lazarus and Tai’s proposal to
support enforcement capacity serves this goal, it is equally important to
provide communities with the capability to advocate for better pollution
controls or stricter emission limits before permits are issued. That way,
overburdened communities can ensure their voices are heard at the critical
stages before it becomes necessary to verify compliance (and not assume
regulatory officials will take their interests into consideration).
Whereas Lazarus and Tai centered their recommendations on what
agencies can do, legal scholar Michael Gerrard recognized that
environmental statutes can be very helpful for public opposition to new
sources of pollution (so long as community members are aware of the
opportunity to weigh-in on permitting and siting decisions).181 “For
existing facilities,” on the other hand, “the statutes have not been very
helpful” because of “grandfathering.”182 Grandfathering, Gerrard
explains, “says that if a facility already has a permit, it can keep it.”183 It
is therefore “extraordinarily difficult to shut down an existing facility.”184
Gerrard is mostly correct. Once a permit has been issued, there may be
a presumption that a facility can keep operating. But many facilities
undergo modifications, some of which can trigger new permitting
requirements. This is known in the air world as New Source Review

177. Press Release, N.J. Governor Phil Murphy, Governor Murphy Signs Historic Environmental
Justice Legislation (Sept. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Governor Phil Murphy Press Release],
https://www.nj.gov/governor/news/news/562020/20200918a.shtml [https://perma.cc/3DE5-N5Z9].
178. Id.
179. Gauna, supra note 42, at 70.
180. See generally ROBERT D. BULLARD, DANA A. ALSTON & PANOS INSTITUTE, WE SPEAK FOR
OURSELVES: SOCIAL JUSTICE, RACE, AND ENVIRONMENT (1990).
181. Gerrard, supra note 167, at 560.
182. Id. at 560–61. The word “grandfathering,” Gerrard notes, comes from “old laws in the deep
south that unless your grandfather voted, you could not either.” Id. at 561.
183. Id. at 561; see also RICHARD L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR AIR: POWER
PLANTS AND THE “WAR ON COAL” (2016) (discussing grandfathering more broadly under the Clean
Air Act).
184. Gerrard, supra note 167, at 561.
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(NSR).185 NSR permitting programs can be used to require new control
technologies (such as BACT or LAER). But even where a state-issued
NSR decision goes unchallenged, the EPA has long maintained that
issuing or renewing a Title V operating permit requires an assessment of
whether the underlying NSR preconstruction permit satisfies all of the
requirements of the Clean Air Act.186 In other words, just because a
facility has a permit, that does not mean advocates cannot later challenge
the permit’s legality and sufficiency (and in a recent case, that challenge
came twenty years later).187
In other examples, the Clean Air Act imposes new substantive
requirements on existing facilities depending on the type or severity of
certain pollution problems (regardless of whether there has been a major
modification at the facility). These checks on existing facilities may be
uniquely important for environmental justice communities, providing an
opportunity to address pollution problems after the effects of a facility
have been observed. I will highlight three such programs.
The first, which received significant attention in recent years, falls
under Clean Air Act section 111(d).188 Under section 111(d), state
environmental agencies must develop plans for regulating existing
sources of certain pollutants after the EPA Administrator determines what
the best system of emission reduction is for controlling those pollutants
from particular source categories. While infrequently used, both the
Obama and Trump Administrations invoked section 111(d) to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants;189 the Biden

185. Learn About New Source Review, ENV’T. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/nsr/learnabout-new-source-review [https://perma.cc/6DQE-L8WK].
186. Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882, 896 (10th Cir. 2020) (rejecting the Trump Administration
EPA’s attempt to stop its practice of “second-guessing” state-issued preconstruction permits). A Fifth
Circuit case decided on slightly different justifications deferred to the EPA’s view, see Env’t Integrity
Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), but the Biden Administration’s EPA is expected to
revert to the agency’s long-standing practice.
187. Sierra Club, 964 F.3d at 889 (“PacifiCorp argues that the Sierra Club caused its own injury
by failing to act for over twenty years. We reject this argument.”).
188. I refer to Clean Air Act section numbers commonly used by environmental practitioners
instead of the U.S. Code numbers, in part because the Clean Air Act has not been formally codified
by Congress into the U.S. Code. See United States Code, OFF. L. REVISION COUNS.,
https://uscode.house.gov/ [https://perma.cc/AUT7-U57J] (noting that Title 42 has not been enacted
as positive law). Section 111, as enacted and amended by Congress, for instance, is reflected at 42
U.S.C. § 7411; generally, there is no difference between what was signed into law and what is in the
U.S. Code, except for one sentence in section 111(d). See Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914,
977–89 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
189. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Repeal of
the Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (Jul. 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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Administration is expected to as well.190 Meanwhile, the Biden
Administration intends to use section 111(d) to regulate methane
emissions from existing oil and natural gas sources.191 While the
substance and debate of these rules are outside the scope of this Article,
the provision is a prominent example of imposing new requirements on
existing sources.
The second and third examples are less likely to be featured in political
campaigns but are more frequently used. Under the NAAQS program (the
second example), the Clean Air Act sets timetables for increasingly
stringent regulatory action for persistent air pollution areas. For example,
ozone nonattainment areas that are classified as marginal nonattainment
(the lowest classification) must impose reasonably available control
technology (RACT) on certain existing sources in the area.192 In moderate
ozone nonattainment areas (the next classification), RACT is expanded to
additional existing sources of volatile organic compounds (a precursor to
the formation of ground-level ozone).193 Each subsequent ozone
classification also reduces the numerical threshold for triggering NSR.194
All of these requirements are imposed through SIPs and thus federally
enforceable.
Finally, the Clean Air Act’s Regional Haze Program (the third
example) is designed to protect air quality in national parks and
wilderness areas. As with section 111(d) and the NAAQS program, states
are charged with taking the “first cut” at developing and implementing air
quality protection plans to reduce pollution that causes visibility

190. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Fossil
Fuel-Fired Existing Electric Generating Units, OFF. OF INFO. & REGUL. AFFS.: OFF. OF MGMT. AND
BUDGET, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2060-AV10
[https://perma.cc/RM34-PZPS] (“On January 19, 2021, the D.C. Circuit Court issued an opinion
vacating the Affordable Clean Energy Rule (found at 40 CFR part 60, subpart UUUUa) - the
previously applicable emission guidelines setting forth greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions from
existing electric generating units (i.e. EGUs). The EPA is working on a new set of emission guidelines
to establish a BSER for existing fossil fuel-fired EGUs to direct States in regulating GHGs within
their borders.”).
191. See
EPA
Rule
List
–
Fall
2021,
REGINFO.GOV,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain?operation=OPERATION_GET_AGENCY_RUL
E_LIST&currentPub=true&agencyCode=&showStage=active&agencyCd=2000
[https://perma.cc/5C9H-4R3T].
192. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(a)(2)(A).
193. Id. § 7511a(b)(2).
194. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c) (lowering the threshold for sources in a Serious Area to “50
tons per year of volatile organic compounds”), with id. § 7511a(d) (lowering the threshold for sources
in a Severe Area to “25 tons per year of volatile organic compounds”), and id. § 7511a(e) (lowering
the threshold for sources in an Extreme Area to “10 tons per year of volatile organic compounds”).
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impairment.195 A key component of this program is the requirement to
install and operate the best available retrofit technology196, or BART, for
qualifying older, existing sources of visibility impairment.
Although these three programs do not require existing sources to shut
down, they can change the economic viability of older, dirtier sources of
pollution.197 Faced with a requirement to install and operate expensive
new pollution controls, some sources opt to retire. This concept has been
used with great success by the Sierra Club’s Beyond Coal campaign. As
of 2015, for example, the campaign claims to have closed down 189 coalfired power plants.198 If environmental justice communities are equipped
with their own technical expertise, they can achieve similar outcomes or
negotiate alternative solutions (like just transitions) based on selfdetermined positions.
D.

Air Regulation and the Need for Community Empowerment

Most environmental regulatory decisions are based on highly-technical
analyses that obfuscate rather than illuminate complex determinations.199
While expanding opportunities for public participation may be intended
to reinforce pluralist principles, that goal is undermined by the inability
of lay-persons to comprehend technical decision-making.200 And when
195. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7411(c)(1), (d)(1)–(2)).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 7491(b)(2)(A).
197. When new requirements are developed or triggered (for example, under any of these
programs), sources must also update their Title V operating permits. And at numerous points
throughout this process, the public has a right to participation. But in order to be meaningful, the
public must be empowered with the expertise to weigh-in on highly technocratic decisions.
198. Michael Grunwald, Inside the War on Coal, POLITICO (May 26, 2015, 11:45 PM),
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/05/inside-war-on-coal-000002/
[https://perma.cc/
284D-LXQS]; see also Rebecca Bratspies, Shutting Down Poletti: Human Rights Lessons from
Environmental Victories, 36 WIS. INT’L L.J. 247, 263 (2019) (discussing a community coalition’s
intervention in various administrative proceedings to “present briefing, testimony, and exhibits” that
gave leverage used to negotiate the shutdown of an old and “dirty” power plant (internal citations
omitted)).
199. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1656 (1995) (“Agencies are thus able to find refuge from APA-generated public debates by
layering rulemakings with scientific terminology and citations. This resort to scientific obfuscation
will limit the pool of commenters to those with at least modest fluency in the scientific and technical
jargon characteristic of a particular standard.”). See generally Steph Tai, Three Asymmetries of
Informed Environmental Decisionmaking, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 659 (2005).
200. Legal scholar Steph Tai refers to this information/capacity gap between the lay public and
well-funded organizations (who may also be proffering information to influence agency decisionmaking) as one of three asymmetries of informed decision-making. Tai, supra note 199, at 688–92.
The other two asymmetries are participatory timing (i.e., when in the process the public can comment
on a proposal) and available outcomes (delay or obstruction seems to be the most available means for
a party to influence an agency). Id. at 692–97.
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lay-persons try to participate, administrative law allows agencies to
privilege those with knowledge, competence, and qualification.201 The
question then is whether people have the specialized knowledge needed
to contribute meaningfully to complex environmental policy decisions—
a John Dewey Paradox.202
Even though environmental decisions are increasingly embedded in the
technocratic languages of environmental impact assessments, cost-benefit
analyses, technology assessments, and risk-benefit analyses, there is “no
such thing as a purely technical decision.”203 In fact, experts routinely
“make many social choices that transcend the standard explanation of
what constitutes scientific objectivity.”204 Although environmental groups
play a central role “in interpreting and making available technical
environmental information to citizens,”205 the long history of exclusion by
those same organizations206 undermines the confidence in marginalized
and under-represented communities that those groups represent diverse
interests. Further, some communities may not oppose all sources of
pollution if there are no alternative economic opportunities available.207
Nevertheless, “legal mandates for science-based planning and for public
participation” often come into conflict and processes that are otherwise
“required to be transparent and open can instead become opaque and

201. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777 (1982)
(discussing struggles against the privileges of knowledge). But see Sheila Jasanoff, The Vanishing
Square: Civic Learning in the Internet Age, HASTINGS CTR. REP. S5, S8 (2021),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/hast.1222 (last visited Apr. 4, 2022) (arguing that
freedom of information and right-to-know laws gave concerned American citizens “unparalleled
access to the expert judgments underlying state decision-making”).
202. FRANK FISCHER, CITIZENS, EXPERTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE POLITICS OF LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE 22 (2000) (explaining that John Dewey’s book, The Public and Its Problems, identified
a paradox with the growth in public participation in the political realm and “the rise of bureaucratic
organization and technical expertise”). Of course, even highly educated individuals may not be able
to grapple with the specific technical questions that are raised in environmental permitting. They
typically do have, however, the means to hire not only competent legal counsel but technical experts
to weigh in on decisions that may affect their communities.
203. Id. at 43.
204. Id. at 104.
205. Id. at 113.
206. Dominic Scicchitano, No Trespassing: The U.S. Environmental Movement’s Long History of
Exclusion (July 27, 2020), https://www.eli.org/vibrant-environment-blog/no-trespassing-usenvironmental-movements-long-history-exclusion
[https://perma.cc/SZP7-GT3D];
see
also
UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR xi–xii (Robert D.
Bullard ed., 1994).
207. See Brigham Daniels, Michalyn Steele & Lisa Grow Sun, Just Environmentalism, 37 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 1, 35 (2018) (noting some communities may be conflicted or opposed to environmental
measures).
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closed.”208 As Fine and Owen observed, this conflict is acute in the Clean
Air Act.
Under the Clean Air Act, science-based planning often relies on
complex simulation models.209 Such “models use mathematical and
numerical techniques to simulate the physical and chemical processes that
affect air pollutants as they disperse and react in the atmosphere.”210 Air
quality models are used by the EPA and state, local, and tribal air agencies
“to both identify source contributions to air quality problems and assist in
the design of effective strategies to reduce harmful air pollutants.”211 They
are often used, for example, “during the permitting process to verify that
a new source will not exceed ambient air quality standards or, if necessary,
determine appropriate additional control requirements.”212 For instance,
even after a level of control is determined through application of control
technology (like BACT), air quality modeling may show that BACT will
not sufficiently control or prevent violations of the NAAQS. In such
cases, permitting authorities could require even more stringent control
options as a result of modeling information.213
In accordance with the Clean Air Act, the EPA provides modeling
guidance and support on the selection and use of air quality models in
regulatory settings (like SIP development and air permitting).214 EPA’s
Guideline on Air Quality Models “provides a common basis for
estimating the air quality concentrations of criteria pollutants used in
assessing control strategies and developing emissions limits.”215 EPA’s
Guideline includes a list of preferred and recommended models,216 and
208. James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between Models and
Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 903 (2005).
209. In fact, modeling and algorithm-based tools may be critical for some environmental decisions
(particularly those related to climate change planning). See generally Sonya Ziaja, How Algorithm
Assisted Decision Making Is Influencing Environmental Law and Climate Adaptation, 48 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 899 (2021).
210. Air Quality Models, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/scram/air-quality-models
[https://perma.cc/EB6S-PMVJ].
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Dir., Off. of Air Quality Planning & Standards,
to Reg’l Air Div. Dirs. 7 (Aug. 23, 2010) (on file with author) (explaining that it may be appropriate
to adopt more stringent controls (beyond the level identified through application of BACT alone)
when modeling information reveals adverse air quality impacts).
214. Modeling Guidance and Support, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
scram/modeling-guidance-and-support [https://perma.cc/2LJ9-WEK9]; see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 51,
app. W(a) (2021).
215. 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, app. W(a).
216. Air Quality Dispersion Modeling: Preferred and Recommended Models, ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/scram/air-quality-dispersion-modeling-preferred-and-recommendedmodels [https://perma.cc/2LJ9-WEK9].
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provides procedures for selecting alternative models and agreeing to
modeling protocol.217
Generally, selection of appropriate models and the development of
modeling protocol should not be controversial and often is not of
significant interest to laypersons—but the agency’s modeling choices can
impact permitting decisions in very significant ways. In fact, meetings are
typically only held between “preparing and reviewing parties [i.e., the
permit applicant and the permitting agency] to define the procedures to be
followed, the data to be collected, the model to be used, and the analysis
of the source and concentration data” to be performed.218 These meetings
are not subject to public participation, nor even advertised to the public.
But within these discussions, significant decisions can be negotiated. For
example, a recent EPA guidance document, “Additional Methods,
Determinations, and Analyses to Modify Air Quality Data Beyond
Exceptional Events,” would allow permitting authorities to “exclude[e],
select[], or adjust[]” air monitoring data purportedly “influenced by an
atypical, extreme, or unrepresentative event in preparing required air
quality analyses” in PSD permitting and Regional Haze planning.219
Ordinarily, the Clean Air Act requires that the public weigh in on the
exclusion of such data influenced by “exceptional events,”220 but here
permit applicants and permitting authorities can agree to ignore data they
deem unsuitable for consideration behind closed doors. Of course, the
final permitting or regulatory decisions are subject to judicial review, but
“[t]he choice of appropriate data sets for the air quality analysis is an issue
largely left to the discretion of the permitting authority.”221
Models are critical for environmental decision-making, but they tend
to be misunderstood222 and can even be difficult for model-savvy

217. Air
Quality
Analysis
Checklist,
ENV’T
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-09/documents/air_quality_analysis_checklistrevised_20161220.pdf [https://perma.cc/AAL5-Y6LL].
218. 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, app. W, § 9.2.1(a).
219. See Memorandum from Richard Wayland, Dir., Air Quality Assessment Div. & Anna Marie
Wood, Dir., Air Quality Pol’y Div., to Reg’l Air Div. Dirs., 1, 3 (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-04/documents/clarification_memo_on_data_
modification_methods.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV67-XHB6].
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 7619(b)(3)(B)(iii).
221. In re Footprint Power Salem Harbor Dev., LP, 16 E.A.D. 546, 576–78 (EAB 2014) (quoting
In re Knauf Fiberglass GmbH, 8 E.A.D. 121, 147 (EAB 1999)); see also Wendy Wagner, Katherine
Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission
Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99 (2011) (explaining that rule development is often informed by early
engagement with stakeholders, well before the notice-and-comment process even begins).
222. Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher & Pasky Pascual, Misunderstanding Models in
Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 293 (2010).
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individuals to comprehend223—accordingly, courts afford great deference
to agencies’ modeling decisions. To be sure, models can sometimes help
summarize and visualize data in ways that are not otherwise possible.224
But the reality, of course, is that “computational models are fragile and
contestable.”225 Nevertheless, courts recognize that the EPA has
“undoubted power to use predictive models,”226 but that “their scientific
nature does not easily lend itself to judicial review.”227 In fact, challengers
“cannot undermine” the EPA’s models “simply by pointing to variables
not taken into account that might conceivably have pulled the analysis’s
sting.”228 They must show how that failure “would have a significant
effect” on the outcome.229 “That the model does not fit every application
perfectly is no criticism; a model is meant to simplify reality in order to
make it tractable.”230 Accordingly, courts will vacate an agency’s decision
only if “the agency’s conclusions drawn from [a] model are
unreasonable.”231
Because many environmental decisions are complex and difficult to
comprehend (and potentially just as difficult to challenge in court), trust
in our permitting authorities and regulatory institutions is essential. But
concerns about regulatory capture (the theory that agencies may come to
be dominated by the interests they regulate and not by the public interest)
can erode that trust.232 “The problem of regulatory capture,” according to
223. Fine & Owen, supra note 208, at 905. Models can also be used to mislead. In January 2016,
opponents of the Clean Power Plan filed an unprecedented request to the U.S. Supreme Court to stay
the rule pending review in the D.C. Circuit based in part on claims that the rule would “trigger[] the
premature closure of coal-fired power plants and coal mines across the country.” See Application of
Utility and Allied Parties for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action Pending Appellate Review,
Basin Elec. Power Co-op v. EPA, 577 U.S. 1126 (2016) (No. 15A776), 2016 WL 344477 (claiming
also that “EPA’s own modeling predicts the immediate closure of 20% of the Southern Company’s
existing coal-fired fleet”). But see Supplemental Declaration of Reid P. Harvey, West Virginia v.
EPA, 577 U.S. 1126 (2016) (No. 15A773), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/
epa_sc_reply_brief_reduced_size.pdf (responding to assertions “that the modeling for the [Clean
Power Plan] somehow demonstrates that irreparable harm will occur, particularly in the form of power
plant retirements during the pendency of litigation”).
224. See generally Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of Environmental
Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 219.
225. Wagner et al., supra note 222, at 295.
226. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
227. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
228. Id. at 805 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
229. Id.
230. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
231. West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
232. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner et al., supra note 221, at 105 (noting increasing concern about
“‘regulatory capture,’ which generally (but not always) referred to the deployment of various financial
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Rahman, “has been a consistent challenge to the modern regulatory state,”
and has led to “mechanisms to insulate regulators from political influence,
or techniques to rationalize agency decision-making.”233 To capture-proof
our institutions, some scholars have argued, requires a return to
managerialism.234 New Chicago School economists, for example,
advocated for greater “cost-benefit analysis” to provide “object proof and
legitimation” to regulatory decisions.235
Whereas numerous scholars have proposed methods to escape
“regulatory capture,”236 and there may even be legal responses to do so,237
a more pernicious phenomenon is “cognitive capture,” under which
“regulators become incapable of thinking in terms other than that of the
industry.”238 Recently, whistleblowers at the Colorado Air Pollution
Control Division alleged that a “long-time bureaucrat ordered modelers
not to analyze potential pollution violations and created a culture of
approving permits ‘at all costs.’”239 Budget and personnel cuts across
agencies would only exacerbate the problem—with fewer resources and
greater workloads, individual regulators may be more willing to accept
technology recommendations or modeling analyses prepared by permit
applicants. In a 2019 report, the Environmental Integrity Project found
that thirty states reduced funding for their environmental agencies’
pollution control programs and forty states reduced staffing levels over
fiscal years 2008 through 2018.240 With staffing cuts as pervasive as this,
inducements (i.e., the prospect of future employment, gifts, or bribes) by regulated parties to co-opt
individual regulators” (internal citations omitted)).
233. RAHMAN, supra note 63, at 24–25.
234. Id. at 44 (citing Sheila Jasanoff, Constitutional Moments in Governing Science and
Technology, 17 SCIENCE & ENG’G ETHICS 621, 632 (2011)).
235. RAHMAN, supra note 63, at 44.
236. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, Understanding Regulatory Capture: An Academic Perspective
from the United States, in MAKING GOOD FINANCIAL REGULATION: TOWARDS A POLICY RESPONSE
TO REGULATORY CAPTURE 53 (Stefano Pagliari ed., 2012) (recommending adequate regulatory
capacity, meaningful transparency, meaningful access by stakeholders, external checks, and internal
checks to address regulatory capture); see also PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 2 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014).
237. Sheldon Whitehouse, Legal Responses to Regulatory Capture, AM. CONST. SOC ‘Y (Nov. 9,
2018), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/blog-post-for-the-american-constitution-society-legalresponses-to-regulatory-capture/ [https://perma.cc/QRV2-62SV].
238. Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1644
n.63 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).
239. Sam Brasch & Miguel Otárola, Whistleblowers Claim the State’s Top Air Regulator Had Them
Falsify Data. Now Environmental Groups Want Him Dismissed, CPR NEWS (Apr. 2, 2021, 9:34 AM),
https://www.cpr.org/2021/04/01/whistleblowers-claim-the-states-top-air-regulator-had-them-falsifydata-now-environmental-groups-want-him-dismissed/ [https://perma.cc/8YU5-VM2G].
240. ENV’T INTEGRITY PROJECT, THE THIN GREEN LINE: CUTS IN STATE POLLUTION CONTROL
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it is increasingly important to ensure that public participation can serve as
a meaningful check on both regulatory and cognitive capture.
Though our environmental laws may have been “pluralist-created and
pluralist-driven,”241 environmental decision-making is increasingly
technocratic. Even courts have “shifted judicial doctrines policing
administrative action toward an ‘expertise-forcing’ framework, requiring
more and more detailed cost-benefit analyses and scientific foundations
for justifying regulatory actions.”242 Meaningful involvement in
environmental decision-making therefore cannot rest simply on extra
process and more outreach—it must include technical assistance for those
communities that are disproportionately affected so that they may more
effectively engage on technical decisions that could determine the
acceptable amount of pollution they will ultimately have to bear.
III. ENHANCED PARTICIPATION: SUPPORTING TECHNICAL
ADVOCACY
The prior Part laid the groundwork for why technical capacity and
advocacy is important—indeed, necessary—in pollution control
decisions, particularly those related to air quality. Nonetheless, efforts to
expand opportunities for public participation have fallen short because
they fail to support technical capacity building in those communities that
are disproportionately impacted by air pollution. This Part introduces a
model for providing that very support (inspired in part by experience
under other environmental laws, like Superfund). By doing so, the model
can inject substance into the procedural right to participation and enhance
meaningful involvement beyond merely doing more community outreach.
It thus offers a capacity-based approach to analyzing procedural justice—
by recognizing, at least for technocratic decisions, that public
participation is only meaningful (and fair) if the public has the capability
to provide comments that agencies cannot ignore.

AGENCIES THREATEN PUBLIC HEALTH (2019), https://environmentalintegrity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/The-Thin-Green-Line-report-12.5.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ63-UNNR].
241. Gauna, supra note 42, at 24.
242. RAHMAN, supra note 63, at 44 (citing Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v.
EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52 (2007)); see also Lisa Heizerling, The
Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1962–69 (2017) (discussing Michigan v. EPA, 576
U.S. 743 (2015) and noting agreement between the majority opinion and dissent that Agencies may
not impose regulatory costs without taking those costs into account, unless Congress expressly signals
otherwise).
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Superfund’s Technical Advisory Grants and the Lower Duwamish
Waterway

Superfund’s Technical Advisory Grant (TAG)243 program is a useful
model for meaningful community involvement that may translate to other
areas of environmental regulation. In 1980, Congress passed the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act244—better known as Superfund—to address the dangers of abandoned
or uncontrolled hazardous waste dumps. Superfund governs the cleanup
of contaminated sites by requiring “potentially responsible part[ies]” to
either cleanup contamination or reimburse the government for EPA-led
cleanup work.245 While the EPA relies on affected communities to inform
its cleanup decision-making, the volumes of technical information related
to cleanup efforts can be a significant barrier to adequate public input.246
Accordingly, in 1986, Congress amended the Superfund program to create
the EPA’s TAG program.247
TAGs are awarded to qualifying non-profit community groups248 to
contract with independent advisors to help those groups understand
243. The Superfund grant program is not the only enhanced participation process available under
environmental laws. For instance, the EPA issued “expanded public participation” regulations under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to provide “earlier opportunities for public
involvement” in the permitting process and “expand[ed] public access to information throughout the
permitting process and the operational lives” of hazardous waste storage, treatment, and disposal
facilities. RCRA Expanded Public Participation, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,417 (Dec. 11, 1995) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 124, 270). Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, citizens can
request an informal conference to discuss objections to a permit, 30 C.F.R. § 773.6(c) (2021), and are
allowed to call for and participate in inspections of mine property, 30 C.F.R. § 721.13(b) (2021). But
no other environmental law provides funding for independent technical support to engage in agency
decision-making.
244. See CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9675).
245. Superfund Liability, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfundliability [https://perma.cc/PL4H-ENKY].
246. Nathan Teske, A Tale of Two TAGs: Dialogue and Democracy in the Superfund Program, 44
AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 664, 664–65 (2000).
247. Id. at 666. Prior to the TAG program, the Environmental Research, Development, and
Demonstration Authorization Act of 1978 (ERDDA) appropriated funds to the EPA to issue grants
across the country to support and encourage participation “by qualified citizens groups in determining
how scientific, technological, and social trends and changes affect the future environment and quality
of life of an area, and for setting goals and identifying measures for improvement.” Environmental
Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-477,
§ 4(d)(2), 92 Stat. 1507, 1509 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4368). Like TAGs, ERDDA limited funding
for groups at $50,000 per year and prohibited them from using the money for litigation. But unlike
TAGs, ERDDA steered away from “single-issue advocates.” H.R. REP. No. 95-1593, at 11 (1978).
Some states also have limited technical assistance programs, such as Massachusetts’s toxic waste
facility siting statute. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21D, § 11 (2020).
248. 40 C.F.R. § 35.4020 (2021) (defining eligibility criteria for community groups).
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technical information about a Superfund site. Importantly, TAGs can be
used to interpret technical information and “comment on site-related
information and decisions.”249 Although TAGs cannot be used to
underwrite legal actions or be used to pay attorney fees,250 “any
information developed through grant assistance may be used . . . in a court
of law.”251 Between 1988 and 2019, a total of 307 TAGs have been
awarded.252 And, as of December 2019, there are forty-four active
TAGs.253 One such TAG is for the Duwamish River Cleanup
Coalition/Technical Advisory Group based in Seattle, Washington.254
The lower Duwamish River is an urban estuary—located south of
downtown Seattle—with a long history of human alteration and
industrialization.255 Up until the 1850s, the land around the Duwamish
River was largely forested and occupied by indigenous communities,
including ancestors of the federally-recognized Muckleshoot and
Suquamish Tribes and the Duwamish Tribe.256 For these people, the river
served as a transit corridor, spiritual haven, and harvesting and fishing
ground.257 But with the treaties of 1854258 and 1855,259 indigenous groups
and tribes of the Puget Sound region were relocated to reservations and
displaced by Euro-American settlers. These settlers then began to clear
the forests and dredge and straighten the Duwamish River to “enhance”
249. Id. § 35.4005. TAGs are also only available for Superfund sites. Other funds are available for
technical assistance across environmental programs, but they cannot be used for advocacy (such as
public comments). The EPA’s Technical Assistance Services for Communities (TASC) program
“help[s] communities better understand the science, regulations and policies of environmental issues
and EPA actions,” but TASC resources cannot be used for “[a]ctivities that advocate for a particular
constituency, position or outcome.” See Technical Assistance Services for Communities (TASC)
Program, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/superfund/technical-assistance-servicescommunities-tasc-program [https://perma.cc/TSH6-TEJW].
250. 40 C.F.R. § 35.4075.
251. H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 231 (1986).
252. Superfund: Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) Program, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/technical-assistance-grant-tag-program
[https://perma.cc/2XEGXSKQ].
253. Id.
254. In the interests of disclosure, the author helped represent the Port of Seattle (a member of the
Lower Duwamish Waterway Group) on Duwamish-related matters from 2013–2014. Nothing in this
Article relies on any non-public information.
255. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS FOR THE LOWER
DUWAMISH
WATERWAY
SUPERFUND
CLEANUP
7
(2013),
https://d10k7k7mywg42z.cloudfront.net/assets/512fbf027a507244640002ea/ej_analysis_ldw_feb_2
013.pdf [https://perma.cc/WDM5-YBPJ] [hereinafter Environmental Justice Analysis].
256. Id. at 14.
257. Id. at 8.
258. See Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1954, 10 Stat. 1132.
259. See Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927.
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navigability.260 After channelization, the area surrounding the Duwamish
River became further developed by industry—ranging from wood
products to marinas and aircraft parts manufacturing (e.g., Boeing
Company Plant 1 was established in 1917).261 With the onset of World
War I, shipyards and aircraft and cement manufacturing became
increasingly important (along with metal fabrication and equipment
manufacturing).262 Several of these industries created “legacy”
contamination issues that are deposited in the sediments throughout the
lower Duwamish River—a five-and-a-half mile stretch of which was
added to EPA’s Superfund priorities list in 2001.263
Presently, the Duwamish Valley includes some of Seattle’s lowestincome and one of the city’s most ethnically diverse neighborhoods.264
The population is forty-two percent foreign-born, forty percent Latinx,
and more than seventy percent people of color, including Asian, Pacific
Islander, Hispanic, African American, and Native American.265 Almost
seventy-two percent of residents live far below the Federal poverty line—
the highest percentage of any area in King County.266 Life expectancy in
the valley is eight years shorter than averages for the City of Seattle and
King County, and thirteen years shorter than more affluent, predominantly
white Seattle neighborhoods.267 It is no surprise that these communities
are also exposed to significant environmental health concerns and
inequities,
including proximity to the Lower Duwamish Waterway
Superfund site (one of the most toxic hazardous waste sites in the
nation), access to only [forty] square feet of green space per
resident . . . , and air pollution from a disproportionate number of
polluting industries as well as surrounding major highways.268
Compounding these inequities, Duwamish Valley residents “have
historically lacked access to, and influence on, decision-makers” who can
“shape the futures of their communities.”269
After the Lower Duwamish Waterway Superfund site was listed in
260. Environmental Justice Analysis, supra note 255, at 8.
261. Id. at 9.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 7.
264. Why Is Our Work Important?, DUWAMISH RIVER CLEANUP COAL., https://www.drcc.org/ourwork-matters [https://perma.cc/5WG2-F832].
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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2001, community members formed the Duwamish River Cleanup
Coalition/Technical Advisory Group (the Coalition) to receive a TAG
from the EPA. The Coalition “represents an alliance of community, tribal,
environmental, and small business groups affected by ongoing pollution
and cleanup plans” for the Lower Duwamish Waterway.270 Its mission is
to “elevate[] the voice[s] of those impacted by the Duwamish River
pollution and other environmental injustices for a clean, healthy, equitable
environment for people and wildlife.”271 And in that effort, the Coalition
“has provided a bridge between EPA and the community, and it has been
key in communicating information about EPA actions and how they will
impact the community.”272 Equally important, the Coalition has been
regularly involved in the cleanup effort for the Lower Duwamish
Waterway Superfund site. In fact, according to Coalition Superfund
Manager and Duwamish Tribal Council Member James Rasmussen,
cleanup decisions were all strengthened when the Coalition was
involved.273 In one example, the Coalition challenged an engineering
evaluation/cost analysis that was based on “industrial-level cleanup
requirements” for the Terminal 117 early action area by advocating for an
“unrestricted use” designation.274 As a result, the EPA directed the Port of
Seattle and the City of Seattle to revise the engineering and cost analyses,
and the Port of Seattle committed to restoring nearby habitat after the early
action area was cleaned up.275 Further, the EPA added twenty-one acres
to the final cleanup decision and an additional 170,000 cubic yards (about
forty acres) of dredging, or permanent contaminant sediment removal.276
These changes were due in part to the Coalition’s ability to hire technical
advisors277 and assist in the preparation of an independent Health Impact
270. Id.
271. About Us: Our Mission, DUWAMISH RIVER CLEANUP COAL., https://www.drcc.org/ourmission [https://perma.cc/5WG2-F832].
272. Environmental Justice Analysis, supra note 255, at 65.
273. Videos, Presentations, and Articles: October 27, 2020 Interview with James Rasmussen—
Duwamish River Cleanup & History, DUWAMISH RIVER CLEANUP COAL., at 8:00–8:25,
https://www.drcc.org/new-page-9 [https://perma.cc/3S4W-82N9]. James Rasmussen is a founding
member of the Coalition and its Superfund manager and represents the Duwamish Tribe on the
Coalition’s Advisory Council.
274. Early Action Areas, DUWAMISH RIVER CLEANUP COAL., https://www.drcc.org/new-page-46
[https://perma.cc/RG7A-D3HT].
275. Id.
276. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, RECORD OF DECISION: LOWER DUWAMISH WATERWAY
SUPERFUND SITE 118 (2014), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/10/715975.pdf [https://perma.cc/948GSWZN] [hereinafter Record of Decision].
277. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, LOWER DUWAMISH WATERWAY SUPERFUND SITE COMMUNITY
INVOLVEMENT
PLAN
26
(2016),
https://semspub.epa.gov/work/10/100033896.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3HZ4-D7ZZ].
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Assessment.278
The Health Impact Assessment, co-authored by Just Health Action (a
health equity non-profit) and the Coalition, found that a range of health
exposures and impacts disproportionately affect people in the Duwamish
Valley.279 Recognizing these impacts, the Port of Seattle launched a pilot
project in 2017 with Duwamish Valley community members and Just
Health Action to focus on improving engagement with near-Port
communities that experience environmental justice issues.280 Following
two years of work, the Port of Seattle approved the Duwamish Valley
Community Equity Program to make permanent the pilot project and
“promote community partnerships, healthy environments and
communities, and economic prosperity.”281
The Lower Duwamish Waterway Superfund site is unique though
because it produced the first-ever stand-alone Environmental Justice
Analysis for a CERCLA decision. In fact, the study was prepared at the
request of the Coalition and other community members because the EPA
agreed it “would help define the most significant issues of concern and
provide a direct route for community input into the decision-making
process to improve cleanup outcomes and reduce exposure for the affected
populations.”282 The study resulted in six recommendations283—five of
which were adopted in EPA’s final cleanup decision (known as the
Record of Decision); the most notable recommendation called for a
Fishers Study.284 Most of the human health risks at the Lower Duwamish
Waterway Superfund site are associated with chemical contaminants
(PCBs, arsenic, carcinogenic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (cPAHs),
etc.) in river sediment, fish, and shellfish.285 Accordingly, state and local
health advisories recommend against consumption of crab, shellfish, and
fish (except salmon) from the Lower Duwamish Waterway.286 The Fishers
Study287—which had significant design and implementation input from
278. Id. at 3.
279. Cumulative Health Impacts Analysis (CHIA), DUWAMISH RIVER CLEANUP COAL.,
https://www.drcc.org/chia [https://perma.cc/ZW38-ZGFG].
280. See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, CASE STUDY: SEATTLE PILOT (2020),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100ZN83.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ23-XPSW].
281. Duwamish
Valley
Community
Equity
Program,
PORT
OF
SEATTLE,
https://www.portseattle.org/duwamishvalley [https://perma.cc/4C9D-436Y].
282. Environmental Justice Analysis, supra note 255, at 6.
283. Id. at 69.
284. Record of Decision, supra note 276, at 132.
285. Environmental Justice Analysis, supra note 255, at 7–8.
286. Id. at 34.
287. LOWER DUWAMISH WATERWAY GRP., LOWER DUWAMISH WATERWAY FISHERS STUDY
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the Coalition—revealed that fishers who eat the polluted “resident fish”
are primarily non-White and non-English speaking individuals and that
the health advisories were “not effective” in reaching all people.288 As a
result, EPA and Public Health Seattle-King County established a joint
community-based program to promote healthy seafood consumption
before, during, and after the cleanup.289 This was accomplished through
“the training and engagement of more than [twenty] ‘Community Health
Advocates,’ who help explain technical information and promote safe fish
consumption within their own communities.”290
Even though a final decision was issued by EPA, the Coalition still
monitors implementation of the cleanup. This includes reviewing EPA
sampling throughout the Superfund site and commenting on proposals to
change the Record of Decision.291 The Coalition also continues to be
served by its technical advisor, Linn Gould, and, in turn, continues to
educate and advocate for Duwamish Valley communities.292 The TAG
program thus has promoted ongoing community involvement for those
most affected by the contamination in the Lower Duwamish Waterway
Superfund site.
B.

Critical Reviews of TAGs

The Duwamish case study is just one example of a successful TAG.
But the program can be improved. In 1994, environmental lawyer Deeohn
Ferris argued that “the grant application process is intself [sic] an
impediment to communities who seek the grants.”293 Ferris, summarizing
GAO testimony before a House subcommittee, notes concerns raised
“about administrative barriers that limit the number of communities that

DATA REPORT (2016), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/10/100036528.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YF9T86G].
288. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, FISHING IN THE DUWAMISH RIVER: WHAT DID WE LEARN AND
WHAT DO WE DO NEXT? 2 (2017), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/10/100046881.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S7DK-8X88].
289. Lower Duwamish Waterway Seattle, WA, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/SiteProfiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=second.cleanup&id=1002020
[https://perma.cc/VG8Q-AADT].
290. CLIFFORD VILLA, NADIA AHMAD, REBECCA BRATSPIES, ROGER LIN, CLIFFORD
RECHTSCHAFFEN, EILEEN GAUNA & CATHERINE O’NEILL, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 320 (3d. ed.
2020).
291. Comments on the Explanation of Significant Differences, DUWAMISH RIVER CLEANUP COAL.
(Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.drcc.org/esd [https://perma.cc/W8HN-FQTN].
292. Id.
293. Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Expanding Public
Participation in the Federal Superfund Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 671, 678 (1994).
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receive grants and prevent communities from effectively using them.”294
This is highlighted by the limited number of awarded TAGs as “compared
to the universe of potentially eligible communities (neighborhoods
affected by one or more of the 1275 NPL sites.)”295 Ferris recommends
that the grant process be simplified and expedited, and she also
recommends that EPA be required to work with communities to create
Community Working Groups.296
“Recognizing that there were many barriers to community
participation,” writes Larry Zaragoza of EPA’s Office of Superfund
Remediation and Technology Innovation, “EPA’s Superfund community
involvement program has developed tools to identify and remove barriers
to participate in the cleanup process.”297 In 1995, for instance, EPA
created the Community Advisory Group (CAG) program. A CAG is made
up of representatives of the community and “is designed to serve as the
focal point for the exchange of information among the local community”
and regulatory agencies involved in the cleanup of a Superfund site.298
CAG membership is intended to be diverse, and may include TAG
recipients (in fact, the EPA encourages CAGs to request TAG funding or
partner with an existing TAG recipient).299 Though the concept of CAGs
was not new (there have been task forces, advisory groups, etc., formed at
many sites), the CAG program formalized the facilitation of inclusive
stakeholder participation.300 Numerous guides have also been published
to aid community groups seeking a TAG.301 Since then, several EPA
studies confirmed that community involvement through TAGs and CAGs
“made a significant contribution to the cleanup effort, led to a better
product and increased public confidence in the project, and ultimately led

294. Id. at 679.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 679–83.
297. Larry J. Zaragoza, The Environmental Protection Agency’s Use of Community Involvement to
Engage Communities at Superfund Sites, 16 INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 21, 26 (2019).
298. Superfund
Community
Advisory
Groups,
U.S.
ENV’T
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-community-advisory-groups
[https://perma.cc/7ZN66995].
299. U.S. ENV’T. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR COMMUNITY ADVISORY GROUPS AT SUPERFUND
SITES 17 (1996), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=10001XJB.TXT [https://perma.cc/
NBT2-XYNX].
300. SUZANNE WELLS, SUPERFUND’S COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT PROGRAM: BUILDING A
SUSTAINABLE PROGRAM 170 (2002) (on file with author).
301. See Superfund: Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) Program, supra note 21; see also Terri
Nichols, Lessons Learned in the Superfund Process: A Guide for Community Advisory Groups (2018)
(Master’s thesis, University of Montana), https://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=12234&context=etd [https://perma.cc/WB9K-NGY3]
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to better decisions.”302
Independent researchers have also found that technical advisors
“increase trust and credibility” in decision-making.”303 Technical advisors
could not only increase public trust in the process (an important aspect of
procedural justice), but remove power imbalances by leveling the field for
community involvement in decision-making.304 Overall, TAGs help
“alleviate problems with trust, credibility, communications, differences in
power in the decision-making process, and overall satisfaction with the
participation process.”305 Technical advisors, in particular, improved
communication and served as both advocate and translator “with the
ability to interpret technical information and translate community
preferences into the technical language of the agency representatives.”306
Of course, TAGs alone “do[] not ensure democracy at Superfund sites.”307
Trust between the community and decision-makers, in addition to EPA’s
willingness to listen308 are crucial factors for successful public
participation. But as long as “formal equality” remains elusive, the TAG
program can “enhance the leverage of [public] participants and provide a
potential check on other, more powerful actors.”309
IV. BUTTRESSING TECHNICAL ADVOCACY IN POLLUTION
CONTROL DECISION-MAKING
Numerous scholars have stressed the importance of public participation
to democratic governance and highlighted the benefits of robust public
engagement.310 In short, public participation serves an important
balancing function—a form of countervailing power which is at the heart
of democratic institutional design. The idea is at least theoretically
straightforward when it comes to electoral politics—on election day,
voters can support specific initiatives or vote out poorly performing
politicians.
With respect to administrative governance, however, public power is
302. WELLS, supra note 300, at 172.
303. Lance R. Cooper, Who Participates and Why? What Do They Expect and What Do They
Accomplish? An Evaluation of the Superfund Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) Program 163 (2017)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University), https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1752&
context=etd [https://perma.cc/J5MR-JGZL].
304. Id.
305. Id. at 162.
306. Id. at 162–63.
307. Teske, supra note 246, at 676.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 677.
310. See supra Part I.
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wrapped up in the ability to challenge final agency actions—there are no
up-down votes for issuing permits or procedures for removing career
bureaucrats simply because a decision is unpopular. Yet the trend in
administrative governance to simply increase opportunities for public
input—from more listening sessions to longer comment periods fails to
address the power disparities that have led to unbalanced administrative
decision-making.311 In some ways, this tracks the pluralist approach that
is embedded in our environmental laws.
Nonetheless, implementing environmental laws is still grounded in
essential technocratic decisions.312 Accordingly, technical capacity is
critical for effective environmental advocacy. As discussed above, some
scholars have suggested a collaborative/negotiated model for decisionmaking or the creation of proxy advocates. These models could work well
in some environmental or land-use settings.313 They may be a misfit,
however, for narrower, technical decisions like control technology
selection and SIP development. Expertise forcing provisions, like control
technology determinations, rely on the professionalism and expertise of
regulators to protect against interest-group capture, but statutory
definitions give decision-makers cover to ignore broader suggestions.314
311. For instance, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment acknowledged
community concerns over the Suncor Refinery and promised to take steps to “better understand,
respond to, and address these concerns where possible.” E-mail from Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health and
Env’t, Air Pollution Control Div., to Jonathan Skinner-Thompson (Dec. 18, 2020, 10:05 AM) (on file
with author). These steps include supplementing the formal public comment process with additional
listening and discussion sessions, such as “small community conversations (for people living near the
Suncor refinery).” SUNCOR PERMIT RENEWAL: PUBLIC INPUT OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 4. CDPHE
will also accept comments in English or Spanish and submissions even can be made outside the formal
public comment period. It is not clear, however, whether comments submitted outside of the formal
public comment period would require a written response or be included in the permit record,
potentially disenfranchising interested participants.
312. For example, control technology reviews require decision-makers to identify the best
available control technology; the best available retrofit technology, the best system of emission
reduction, and the maximum achievable control technology (among others). See supra section II.B–
.D. This can mean a scrubber—which captures pollutants in the gases from burning coal—must be
installed and operated at 70%, 80%, or 90% efficiency (depending on cost considerations). Id.
Similarly, new pollution sources need to model air quality impacts so as not to degrade air in our
national parks and other protected areas (not just local air pollution). Id. But these models rely on
complicated programs that are generally not well understood and require decisions on what data inputs
to include or exclude.
313. See, e.g., Mark Squillace, Meaningful Engagement in Public Lands Decision Making, 59
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 21-1, 21-34 to 21-35 (2017) (advocating for a civic-minded approach to
land and natural resource management).
314. Although, at least when the EPA wants to, the agency has successfully introduced compliance
alternatives into otherwise restrictive definitions, for example, the CSAPR “better-than-BART” (i.e.,
cap-and-trade) alternative to installation of the best available retrofit technology. Util. Air Regul. Grp.
v. EPA, 885 F.3d 714 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (upholding EPA’s rule authorizing states “to treat CSAPR
compliance as a better-than-BART alternative”).
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Further, with budget-shortfalls and staffing limitations, state agencies—
which are often the primary permitting authorities—may be more inclined
to rely on applicant-developed recommendations and modeling. Modeling
protocols, moreover, are agreed to outside of public scrutiny and are often
inaccessible to laypersons until well after those decisions have already
been made (if ever).
Empowering communities to speak for themselves requires technical
expertise. While the TAG experience can be a good starting point, it may
not fully translate to the Clean Air Act permitting and SIP development
context. As noted above, there are only forty-four active TAGs in the
country. But there may be hundreds or thousands of SIP and permitting
actions processed each year. Not all of those will affect disproportionately
impacted communities, nor will they all implicate control technology
reviews or other similarly consequential decisions. Accordingly, this
section addresses the implementation of a technical support program for
such decisions by focusing on the who and how.
The CLEAN Future Act, a recently proposed bill in the U.S. House of
Representatives, offers one method to narrow focus. The proposed bill
“[f]ollows the successful example of Technical Assistance Grants (TAG)
available through the Superfund program to empower communities on the
fenceline of petrochemical facilities to participate, with the help of
independent experts, in decisions impacting their health and safety.”315
Specifically, the bill authorizes the EPA Administrator to award grants “to
participate in decisions impacting the health and safety of their
communities in connection with an actual or potential release of a covered
hazardous air pollutant.”316 In other words, the bill uses refineries and
hazardous air pollutants as a proxy for identifying relevant communities.
But this is unsatisfactory. Many other sources, such as power plants, other
industrial sources, and mobile sources, are significant contributors to
pollution impacts on environmental justice communities.317 And
hazardous air pollutants are just a subset of the pollution problems;
common pollutants, including deadly particulates, are equally important
and are more readily addressed through SIPs and other regulatory
programs.318
315. COMM. ON ENERGY & COM., SUMMARY OF THE CLIMATE LEADERSHIP AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTION
FOR
OUR
NATION’S
(CLEAN)
FUTURE
ACT
19
(2021),
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/Sec
tion-by-Section%20of%20CLEAN%20Future%20Act%20117th.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQ69-J6B2].
316. CLEAN Future Act, H.R. 1512, 117th Cong. § 602 (2021).
317. See Tessum, supra note 116, at 2.
318. E.g., id. at 1; Ihab Mikati, Adam F. Benson, Thomas J. Luben, Jason D Sacks & Jennifer
Richmond-Bryant, Disparities in Distribution of Particulate Matter Emission Sources by Race and
Poverty Status, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 480, 480 (2018).
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As an alternative to the approach proposed in the CLEAN Future bill,
I recommend building on New Jersey’s screening thresholds to help
identify the most vulnerable communities among us. In 2009, the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection issued the report
“Strategies for Addressing Cumulative Impacts in Environmental Justice
Communities.”319 The report recognized a correlation between cumulative
environmental impacts and socio-economic indicators, including income
status and race or ethnicity, and recommended using socio-economic
indicators to identify vulnerable populations.320 In light of the correlation,
New Jersey’s S. 232/A.B. 2212 established screening thresholds for
recognizing “overburdened” communities—i.e., communities in which
(1) at least thirty-five percent of households qualify as low-income
households; (2) at least forty percent of residents are designated as
“minority” or tribal communities; or (3) at least forty percent of
households have limited English proficiency.321 Using this information,
the New Jersey law prohibits regulators from issuing a permit to facilities
that “will have a disproportionately negative impact on overburdened
communities.”322
While demographic indicators alone may be sufficient to identify the
most at-risk communities, geographic information system (GIS)
technology, such as EPA’s EJSCREEN and other second-generation
environmental justice mapping tools (like California’s CalEnviroScreen),
can help visualize the geographic distribution of population vulnerability
factors and pollution burden.323 EPA’s Charles Lee proposes using this
information to articulate “an empirically based definition” of
disproportionate impacts, which—he points out—”has eluded
[environmental justice] advocates, scholars, policymakers, and
practitioners since the issuance of Executive Order No. 12898 in 1994.”324
Lee believes officials can use the definition to better integrate
environmental justice into government programs by (1) identifying,
characterizing, and integrating disproportionate impacts and
(2) enhancing meaningful community engagement.325 Without this
319. CUMULATIVE IMPACTS SUBCOMM., ENV’T JUST. ADVISORY COUNCIL, STRATEGIES FOR
ADDRESSING CUMULATIVE IMPACTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES (2009),
https://www.nj.gov/dep/ej/docs/ejac_impacts_report200903.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7WM-7GVR].
320. Id. at 2, 18 (recognizing that many low-income and people of communities in New Jersey face
significant environmental and health problems as a result of cumulative pollution impacts).
321. P.L. 2020,
ch. 92,
[https://perma.cc/B3U2-ES4N].

C.13:1D-158(2),

https://www.nj.gov/dep/ej/docs/ej-law.pdf

322. Press Release, N.J. Governor Phil Murphy, supra note 177.
323. Lee, supra note 175, at 10212.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 10213.
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understanding, community outreach “devolves into a perfunctory ‘box to
be checked’ exercise.”326 Using GIS mapping tools, on the other hand, can
help grant-makers and legislatures identify the most at-risk communities
in need of technical assistance.
In addition to proactively identifying the most at-risk communities
through GIS mapping, I recommend leveraging environmentalenforcement actions to prioritize communities that are suffering from
unauthorized pollution levels. Former legal scholar Patrice Simms (now
with Earthjustice) argued that community empowerment partnerships
could be integrated into Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs),
which are an enforcement tool used to mitigate monetary penalties in
exchange for environmentally beneficial projects.327 These partnerships,
Simms explains, could:
(1) help to identify ongoing or anticipated environmental
enforcement cases . . . ; (2) identify and engage potentially
affected stakeholder communities . . . ; (3) provide or facilitate
technical assistance to community organizations in the
formulation of SEP proposals; and (4) assist with engagement and
advocacy . . . in connection with specific environmental
enforcement proceedings or initiatives.328
My proposal dovetails with Simms’ by using SEPs to build community
technical capacity by adopting a polluter pays approach to funding
technical assistance. In this way, sources that are already subject to an
enforcement action would be responsible for empowering local
communities—facilitating a transfer of power from polluter to impacted
community.329
As with the Superfund experience, it would be appropriate to limit the
availability of funds to registered community groups that are not affiliated
with a national organization or academic institution (to ensure limited
funds are directed to communities without existing support). And it would
be appropriate to limit technical support funding to capacity building or
regulatory advocacy (i.e., not for lawsuits or other legal actions or for
attorney fees). But like Superfund TAGs, my proposal would allow
groups to rely on technical material developed before litigation (such as
technical analyses submitted with a public comment) to challenge a final
326. Id. at 10218.
327. Patrice L. Simms, Leveraging Supplemental Environmental Projects: Toward an Integrated
Strategy for Empowering Environmental Justice Communities, 47 ENV’T L. REP. 10511, 10521
(2017).
328. Id. at 10526.
329. This might also mitigate critiques that government should not provide grants to certain
communities (over others) or fund opposition work.
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agency action.
Cultivating participation, of course, requires more than just money for
hiring technical experts.330 As with the Superfund TAG program,
providing communities with resources for technical consultants is just part
of the solution. Drawing from the EPA’s Community Advisory Group
program, and recommendations for the use of proxy advocates (discussed
supra section I.B.), pollution control advisory groups should be convened
to educate community members and advocate on their behalf.
Pollution control advisory groups would serve multiple purposes to
enhance meaningful participation. For example, these groups would
relieve individual community members of having to stay informed and
active in the dozens or hundreds of decisions that may impact their lives.
Over time, these groups can build institutional expertise on certain topics
and gain legitimacy before decision-makers.
These same groups should also be tasked with on-going monitoring and
compliance verification (as was suggested by Lazarus and Tai). Even after
the installation of advanced pollution controls, some sources may request
exemptions for startup, shutdown, or malfunction/maintenance periods.331
Or they might stop operating their controls after installation. Or sources
will report hundreds of “deviations” from their permit terms and
conditions that may or may not be considered violations subject to
enforcement actions.332 Ensuring that these controls continue to operate at
peak efficacy requires continuous vigilance. But interpreting compliance
reports and monitoring data can be indecipherable or confusing.
“Environmental compliance is a sociological problem, not a technical
one,” explained Jane Williams, of California Communities Against

330. Freeman, supra note 48, at 81.
331. The legality of such requests is disputed. In the SIP context, the EPA has taken different
positions depending on the Administration. Compare State Implementation Plans; Response to
Petition for Rulemaking, 80 Fed. Reg. 33840 (June 12, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52), with
Memorandum from Andrew R. Wheeler, Adm’r of the Env’t. Prot. Agency, to Reg’l Adm’rs 1-10
(Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-10/documents/placeholder_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PNA4-WA6W]. For setting NESHAPs, however, the D.C. Circuit has said that such
exemptions are not authorized under the Clean Air Act. Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019, 1021
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
332. See Letter from Wes McNeil, Env’t. Team Lead, Suncor, to Matt Burgett, Colo. Dept. of Pub.
Health and Env’t. (Aug. 26, 2019), https://pdf.wildearthguardians.org/support_docs/JanJune%202019%20Semiannual-West.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZYM3-4SED] (including Annual
Compliance Report July 1, 2018 – June 30 and 2019 Semi-Annual Deviation Report – January 1,
2019 – June 30, 2019 for Plants 1 & 3); Letter from Wes McNeil, Env’t. Team Lead, Suncor, to Matt
Burgett,
Colo.
Dept.
of
Pub.
Health
and
Env’t.
(Aug.
26,
2019),
https://pdf.wildearthguardians.org/support_docs/Jan-June%202019%20Semiannual-East.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48M9-ANR7] (including Annual Compliance Report July 1, 2018 – June 30 and
2019 Semi-Annual Deviation Report – January 1, 2019 – June 30, 2019 for Plant 2).
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Toxics.333 “Once we told a source that we were shutting down some
nearby monitors, but, in reality, we didn’t. After that, we started seeing
immediate spikes in pollution. Continuous fenceline monitoring is the best
tool we currently have.”334 Establishing pollution control advisory groups
that are supported by technical advisors in disproportionately impacted
communities can be one more tool to verify on-going compliance even in
the face of state agency budget shortfalls and staffing cuts.
Finally, my proposal is predicated on communities knowing the
importance of their voices in environmental decision-making. While
studies show that technical capacity grants are made to nearly a quarter of
all environmental justice grant awards (second only to informational
grants),335 they could be an even greater share if community groups
recognize the importance of technical capacity in environmental decisionmaking. Thus, it is imperative that the availability of grants be supported
by a public education campaign. To start, the EPA and state agencies that
purport to value environmental justice must educate impacted
communities on the importance of their input and the availability of
technical assistance. That is, telling the community that they can get
involved should be combined with information about how best to be
involved. This could be accomplished through the establishment of an
environmental justice ombud in each of the EPA’s regional offices (and
with relevant state agencies). Once community concerns are known, the
ombud could identify the relevant permitting actions or SIPs those
community members should consider commenting on. This will help
communities prioritize the most relevant decisions in which to participate.
Independent organizations can also help broaden the reach of that
message. The Center for Urban Environmental Reform, for instance,
released comic books (written by legal scholar Rebecca Bratspies) to
“help[] communities identify and seize their moment to participate in
environmental decisionmaking.”336 These outside organizations could
have lasting value should the EPA’s outreach efforts fizzle with time or
change from Administration to Administration.
333. Interview with Jane Williams, Executive Director, California Communities Against Toxics
(June 9, 2021).
334. Id.
335. Troy D. Abel & Mark Stephan, Tools of Environmental Justice and Meaningful Involvement,
10 ENV’T. PRAC. 152, 157 (2008).
336. CHARLIE LA GRECA & REBECCA BRATSPIES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CHRONICLES: BOOK
1, MAYAH’S LOT, at ii (2015), http://cuer.law.cuny.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01//
MayahEJ_Digest.reduced%20final%20version.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE9B-8JRF]; see also CHARLIE
LA GRECA & REBECCA BRATSPIES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CHRONICLES: BOOK 2, BINA’S PLANT
(2015), https://cuer.law.cuny.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/binas%20plant%20reduced%20size.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR36-A8HE].
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Community outreach and information sharing may be important for
regulatory transparency. But they rest at the lower rungs of meaningful
participation. To be an effective participant in most environmental
decision-making—that is, to have meaningful input—technical capacity
is not only important but necessary. In fact, it may be more important than
having legal counsel when it comes to challenging technocratic decisions,
like selecting and implementing pollution controls.337 Thus, if we wish for
people to have a real opportunity to participate in decisions that may affect
their environment or health, we must not only seek out the involvement
of those potentially affected but ensure that they have the capacity—that
is independent technical expertise and support—to participate
meaningfully in those decisions. In this way, we can ensure that
procedural justice gains meaning and lifts the most at-risk communities
closer to the highest rung of Arnstein’s ladder.
A.

Technical Capacity and the Promise of Procedural Justice

Today, environmental justice voices are being elevated throughout the
country. In January 2021, the White House established an Environmental
Justice Advisory Council to “bring greater visibility to [environmental
justice] across the federal government” and will provide advice and
recommendations “on a whole-of-government approach” to
environmental justice.338 In May 2021, the EPA—using its rarely-invoked
Clean Air Act section 303 authority—ordered Limetree Bay to stop
operations at its St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands refinery, which is located
in a community disproportionately affected by environmental burdens.339
337. For instance, recently the Colorado Air Quality Control Commission set up a program to
match pro bono counsel with disproportionately impacted community groups interested in greenhouse
gas rulemakings. However, under Colorado law, party participants in rulemakings are required to
present technical and economic analyses to support their recommendations. When asked if the
Commission would make funds available to hire experts to prepare such analyses, then-Director of
Environmental Programs at the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, John
Putnam, responded “great question and great idea. Right now, we do not have budget from the
Legislature to do that, but we are interested in exploring options to improve capacity.” Air Quality
Control Comm’n for the Colo. Bar Ass’n, Env’t L. Section, Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t,
Zoom Webinar on Giving Voice to Disproportionately Impacted Communities (Jan. 7, 2021) (on file
with the author) (comment of John Putnam, Dir. of Env’t. Programs).
338. Environmental Justice: White House Environmental Justice Advisory Council, U.S. ENV’T
PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/white-house-environmental-justiceadvisory-council#whejacoverview [https://perma.cc/C3RA-5P2Q].
339. Press Release, Env’t Prot. Agency, EPA Uses Emergency Powers to Protect St. Croix
Communities and Orders Limetree Bay Refinery to Pause Operations (May 14, 2021),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-uses-emergency-powers-protect-st-croix-communities-andorders-limetree-bay-refinery [https://perma.cc/Q9YK-LVUU]. It was the fourth time in the EPA’s
history that the agency had taken such a step (the previous three times came in 1971, 1994, and 1997).
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Numerous states have proposed or enacted environmental justice
regulations and policies.340 New Jersey became the first state to require
consideration of “cumulative impact[s]” in permitting decisions (and
similar requirements are pending in Congress as well341).342 Researchers
are confirming long suspected correlations between pollution and race.343
And Big Green groups—the heavily-staffed and well-funded national
non-profits—are diversifying leadership344 and demonstrating a clearer
commitment to the urban issues that were once ignored. The times are
indeed changing.
Yet the renewed push for inclusion of disproportionately impacted
communities in environmental decision-making is also falling back on
pluralist inclinations. More outreach and opportunities to participate in the
regulatory process alone will not, at this Article contends, correct the
underlying vulnerabilities faced by low-income communities and
communities of color. Rather, those efforts will leave these communities
no better than before, or worse, cause them to lose faith in the process and
abandon participation altogether. As Arnstein and Gauana previously
warned, the pluralist model for inclusion does not address the structural
barriers erected against marginalized communities.345
Sean Reilly, EPA Orders Emergency Halt at Troubled Refinery, E&E NEWS (May 14, 2021, 4:34
PM), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063732657/ [https://perma.cc/V59V-Y7DB. The refinery has
since filed for bankruptcy. Sean Reilly, Troubled Refinery Bankrupt After EPA Shutdown,
GREENWIRE (July 13, 2021, 1:50 PM), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2021/07/13/stories/
1063737027 [https://perma.cc/JUL3-5MCC].
340. Abby Blocker, State Trends in Environmental Justice Legislation, WASTE 360 (June 8, 2021),
https://www.waste360.com/legislation-regulation/state-trends-environmental-justice-legislation
[https://perma.cc/D3GV-8TCF].
341. Yvette Cabrera, A Groundbreaking Environmental Justice Bill Is Poised to Become Law,
GRIST (Mar. 19, 2021), https://grist.org/equity/democrats-congress-environmental-justice-tammyduckworth/ [https://perma.cc/M4ZV-R66Z].
342. Press Release, N.J. Governor Phil Murphy, supra note 177.
343. See supra note 114.
344. See generally GREEN 2.0: 2021 NGO & FOUNDATION TRANSPARENCY REPORT CARD 4
(2021),
https://diversegreen.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/2021-ngo-foundation-transparencyreport-card.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UXN-CNBW].
345. Though correlations between pollution burdens and race are well documented, see id.,
technical assistance funds need not be distributed solely on the basis of race. Indeed, such a program
could invite unwanted litigation risks. See, e.g., Michael Levenson, Judge Blocks $4 Billion U.S. Debt
Relief
Program
for
Minority
Farmers,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
23,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/23/us/politics/biden-debt-relief-black-farmers.html
[https://
perma.cc/T297-GWS9] (discussing legal injunction secured by a white farmer challenging a loan
forgiveness program for “socially disadvantaged farmers”—defined as those who are Black,
American Indian/Alaska Native, Hispanic, Asian and Pacific Islander—which was intended to
address a long history of racial injustice in American farming). Instead, the racial makeup of an area
is just one indicator of an overburdened environmental justice community (others may include income
levels, education levels, and English language abilities).
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These structural barriers, moreover, are reinforced by core principles
of administrative law: (1) comments must be relevant and significant in
order to require consideration by decision-makers; and (2) legal
arguments must be based on issues that were raised with reasonable
specificity during the comment process. In other words, absent effective
commenting, the opportunity to challenge an otherwise deficient decision
simply does not exist. And the communities that are directly impacted by
that decision are left powerless in the eyes of the agency and the courts.
This Article does not argue that core administrative principles must be
reconsidered—there may be important efficiencies to allowing agencies
to ignore vague or irrelevant issues (and in providing agencies with some
certainty that issues will not be raised for the first time in litigation).346
Rather, it seeks to underscore the need for effective and empowered
participation.
Improving the participatory process for frontline environmental justice
communities will not remove all of the structural barriers to meaningful
participation. Nor will it satisfy advocates who call for a more
transformative approach to realizing environmental justice.347 But I
contend that it can serve to deepen deliberative democracy by giving voice
to communities who seek to engage in environmental decisions but lack
the capacity to do so on equal footing with the regulated community and
environmental decision-makers.
Recognizing that many environmental decisions (such as permitting
and standards setting) are increasingly complex and technocratic, this
Article offers a capacity-based approach to assessing procedural justice.
That is, if we aspire to the meaningful involvement of environmental
justice communities in environmental decision-making, we must consider
whether those communities can truly influence a regulatory decision.
Only then can the promise of procedural justice be substantively
meaningful for environmental justice communities.
CONCLUSION
In Winter 2021, the Colorado Department of Public Health and
Environment invited public comment on one of Suncor’s Title V permits
(for Plant 2). The second permit (covering Plants 1 & 3) will be reviewed
later and may address Suncor’s request to raise pollution limits for

346. That said, perhaps courts or agencies could adopt rules that treat comments by unrepresented
individuals as pro se litigants—giving them every benefit of the doubt.
347. See DAVID NAGUIB PELLOW, WHAT IS CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE? 18–30 (2018).
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hydrogen cyanide, a deadly gas.348 In Summer 2021, CDPHE also
announced proposed revisions to address haze pollution, which could
trigger stricter emission limits for the Suncor Refinery.349 Thus, despite
being a nearly ninety-year-old facility, there are still opportunities for the
public to request better pollution controls, enhanced monitoring
requirements, or even to shut it down.350
Indeed, a coalition of conservation and local environmental justice
groups recently hired an independent expert to model emissions from the
Suncor Refinery.351 Due in part to their advocacy, state regulators
preliminarily approved more aggressive pollution limits—warning
greater technological controls (proposed by the coalition) would be
required if the proposed limits are not achieved five years earlier than
originally anticipated.352 And then, on March 25, 2022, the EPA notified
CDPHE—in a rare statement—that the Agency objected to a portion of
the Plant 2 renewal permit.353 The EPA explained that CDPHE’s
determinations to exempt three flaring sources were improper and
CDPHE would need to revise the permit, provide the public with another
opportunity to review and comment, and submit a new proposed permit
to the EPA for review.354
Empowering environmental justice communities with technical

348. Suncor Air Permit, PUB. EMPS. FOR ENV’T RESP. (June
https://www.peer.org/colorado-air-pollution-suncor/ [https://perma.cc/5JF7-TZN7].

4,

2021),

349. E-mail from Lauren McDonnell, Climate Change Outreach Planner, Colo. Dep’t of Pub.
Health & Env’t, to Jonathan Skinner-Thompson (Aug. 5, 2021, 4:42 PM) (on file with author).
350. Bruce Finley, Battle Over Suncor Oil Refinery Intensifies as State Weighs Permit Renewal,
Metro Denver Residents Demand Closure, DENVER POST (May 5, 2021, 6:00 AM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2021/05/05/suncor-refinery-permit-renewal-public-hearings
[https://perma.cc/AA35-9BMJ].
351. LINDSEY MEYERS, AIR DISPERSION MODELING ANALYSIS FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE OF
PERMITTED EMISSIONS WITH THE ONE-HOUSE SO2 AND NO2 NAAQS: SUNCOR REFINERY 3 (2021),
https://peer.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/LMeyers-Suncor-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DWGUKC8]. The analysis revealed that Suncor’s previously permitted limits would cause exceedances of
the one-hour sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide NAAQS. Id. at 18. In other words, Suncor’s
permitted limits were too weak and needed to be strengthened (or its permit should be denied). Id. at
19.
352. Michael Booth, Suncor Must Make Pollution Cuts to Meet New Haze Rules Protecting
Colorado
Park
Views,
COLO.
SUN
(Dec.
2,
2021,
4:08
AM),
https://coloradosun.com/2021/12/02/suncor-pollution-cuts-regional-haze-rocky-mountain-nationalpark/ [https://perma.cc/WE2L-LXVP].
353. See Letter from KC Baker, Regional Administrator, to Shaun McGrath, Dir. of Env’t Health
and
Prot.,
Colo.
Dep’t
of
Pub.
Health
and
Env’t
(Mar.
25,
2022),
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-03/epa-suncor-plant-2-title-v-objection-letter2022-03-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQN4-HKYZ].
354. Id.
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expertise tackles multiple dimensions of environmental justice.355 It not
only gives substance to the principle of meaningful involvement, but it
serves distributive, corrective, and structural justice principles as well. To
the extent that expert-backed community advocacy results in strengthened
pollution limitations, those communities will increase life expectancies
and enjoy a better quality of life than before. Tying technical assistance
funding to SEPs ensures that polluters pay for non-compliance with
environmental laws. And, finally, providing technical assistance will help
communities overcome structural barriers embodied in administrative law
and judicial review.
Efforts to broaden and deepen participation must recognize the context
in which public input is requested. By doing so, we can close the gap
between procedural and substantive justice—and make public input
meaningful to not only decision-makers but to the communities whose
voices are often ignored.

355. Over twenty years ago, legal scholar Robert Kuehn proposed four dimensions to assess
environmental justice progress: distributive, corrective, social, and procedural justice. Kuehn, supra
note 31, at 10681. Distributive justice is not redistribution; it is “equal protection for all and the
elimination of environmental hazards . . . . [D]istributive justice is achieved through a lowering of
risks, not a shifting or equalizing of existing risks.” Id. at 10684. Corrective justice concerns how
damages are addressed and is embodied in the polluter pays principle. Social justice includes fairness
in the economic and cultural effects of environmental decisions. Procedural justice is “the right to be
treated as an equal.” Id. at 10688. Since then, EPA advisor Charles Lee suggests two more elements
should be considered: recognitional justice and structural justice. Lee, supra note 175, at 10209 (citing
additions by David Schlosberg and Ana Baptista). Recognitional justice, summarizes Lee, “speaks to
the social norms, language, and mores that mediate our relations with those who are denigrated and
less well-off.” Id. Structural justice, finally, brings in concepts that are deeply rooted in issues of race
and structural processes that perpetuate racism through government decisions. Together, these
elements provide a useful analytical framework for identifying and addressing environmental justice.
But at this point, according to Lee, environmental justice practice has “stagnated at the point of merely
doing more community outreach,” and is “largely lacking” in the other elements of justice. Id. at
10218.
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